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A completeness result for implicit justification stit
logic
Grigory K. Olkhovikov
Abstract. We present a completeness result for the implicit fragment of
justification stit logic introduced in [5]. Although this fragment allows for
no strongly complete axiomatization, we show that a restricted form of
strong completeness (subsuming weak completeness) is available, as well as
deduce a version of restricted compactness property.
stit logic, justification logic, completeness, compactness
1 Introduction
Basic justification stit (or jstit, for short) logic was introduced in [5] as an envi-
ronment for analysis of doxastic actions related to proving activity within a somewhat
idealized community of agents, combining expressive means of stit logic by N. Belnap et
al. [3] with those of justification logic by S. Artemov et al. [2]. This logic, therefore, re-
tains the full set of expressive means of the two above-mentioned logics and introduces
some new expressive means on top of them. These new expressive means were called in
[5] proving modalities and they capture different modes in which one can speak about
proving activity of an agent. The general idea behind jstit logic is that one gets a
right classification of such modes if one intersects the distinction between agentive and
factual (aka moment-determinate) events developed in stit logic with the distinction
between explicit and implicit modes of knowledge which is central to justification logic.
The first distinction, when applied to proofs, corresponds to a well-known philosophical
discussion of proofs-as-objects vs proofs-as-acts. One refers to a proof-as-act when one
says that agent j proves some proposition A, but one refers to a proof-as-object when
saying that A was proved. While doing that, one can either simply say that A was
proved, or add that A was proved by some proof t; and the difference between these
two modes of speaking is exactly the difference between implicit and explicit reference
to proofs. All in all this gives us the following classification of proving modalities:
Agentive Moment-determinate
Explicit j proves A by t A has been proven by t
Prove(j, t, A) Proven(t, A)
Implicit j proves A A has been proven
Prove(j, A) Proven(A)
In [5] the semantics of these modalities was presented and informally motivated in
some detail. However, in the present paper, we are going to look into one fragment of
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basic jstit logic rather than the full system. The reason for this is the relatively high
level of complexity of the full basic jstit logic. The fragment in question is, in fact, the
basic jstit logic without the two explicit proving modalities given in the first row of
table above. The resulting restricted system, therefore, features the full set of expressive
means inherited from justification logic and stit logic plus the two implicit modalities,
Prove(j, A) and Proven(A). For the same reason (i.e. keeping the complexity down),
we also use a slightly simplified version of the semantics introduced in [5] to interpret
this logic.
The resulting system, which we will call the implicit jstit logic, still allows for
an analysis of the interplay between proofs-as-acts and proofs-as-objects, although it
limits the format of such an analysis to some extent and also zeros out the interplay
between implicit and explicit modes of speech. But even this restricted logic, has, as
will be shown below, a challenging degree of complexity, which makes the problem of
axiomatizing it both interesting and non-trivial.
The present paper is devoted to solving this exact problem. Its layout is as follows.
In Section 2 we define the language and the semantics of the logic at hand. We also show
some features of implicit jstit logic, which limit the power and the scope of possible
completeness results, namely, the failure of compactness and finite model properties.
The latter fails in a rather strong form; as a result, one cannot impose any finite bound
not only on the overall size of a model satisfying a given formula, but also on the length
of histories in such a model. The failure of compactness also means that one cannot
have a strongly complete axiomatization for this logic while retaining a finitary notion
of proof.
Despite all these challenges, however, it turns out that with implicit jstit logic one
can do much better than just weak completeness; in fact, our main result is much closer
to the strong completeness and only differs from the latter in that some restrictions are
imposed on proof variables occurring in a given set of formulas. The exact formulation
of this result is given in Section 3, where we also define the axiom system which displays
this exact degree of completeness w.r.t. implicit jstit logic. We immediately show this
system to be sound w.r.t. the semantics introduced in Section 2, and we end the section
by proving a number of theorems in the system.
Section 4 then contains the bulk of technical work necessary for the completeness
theorem. It gives a stepwise construction and adequacy check for all the numerous
components of the canonical model and ends with a proof of a truth lemma. Section 5
then reaps the fruits of the hard work done in Section 4, giving a concise proof of the
completeness result and drawing some quick corollaries including the weak completeness
theorem and a restricted form of compactness property. Then follows Section 6, giving
some conclusions and drafting directions for future work.
In what follows we will be assuming, due to space limitations, a basic acquaintance
with both stit logic and justification logic. We recommend to peruse [1] for a quick
introduction into the basics of stit logic, and [4, Ch. 2] for the same w.r.t. justification
logic.
2 Basic definitions and notation
We fix some preliminaries. First we choose a finite set Ag disjoint from all the
other sets to be defined below. Individual agents from this set will be denoted by
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letters i and j. Then we fix countably infinite sets PV ar of proof variables (denoted
by x, y, z, w, u) and PConst of proof constants (denoted by a, b, c, d). When needed,
subscripts and superscripts will be used with the above notations or any other notations
to be introduced in this paper. Set Pol of proof polynomials is then defined by the
following BNF:
t := x | c | s+ t | s× t |!t,
with x ∈ PV ar, c ∈ PConst, and s, t ranging over elements of Pol. In the above
definition + stands for the sum of proofs, × denotes application of its left argument to
the right one, and ! denotes the so-called proof-checker, so that !t checks the correctness
of proof t.
In order to define the set Form of formulas we fix a countably infinite set V ar of
propositional variables to be denoted by letters p, q, r, s. Formulas themselves will be
denoted by letters A,B,C,D, and the definition of Form is supplied by the following
BNF:
A := p | A ∧B | ¬A | [j]A | ✷A | t:A | KA | Prove(j, A) | Proven(A),
with p ∈ V ar, j ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol.
It is clear from the above definition of Form that we are considering a version
of modal propositional language. As for the informal interpretations of modalities,
[j]A is the so-called cstit action modality and ✷ is historical necessity modality, both
modailities are borrowed from stit logic. The next two modailities, KA and t:A,
come from justification logic and the latter is interpreted as “t proves A”, whereas the
former is the strong epistemic modality “A is known”.1 The two remaining modalities,
Prove(j, A) and Proven(A) are implicit modalities related to the proving activity of
agents and their informal interpretation was considered in Section 1.
We assume ✸, 〈K〉, and 〈j〉 for a j ∈ Ag as notations for the dual modalities of ✷,
K and [j], respectively.
For the language at hand, we assume the following semantics. A jstit model is a
structure
M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉
such that:
• Tree is a non-empty set. Elements of Tree are called moments.
• ≤ is a partial order on Tree for which a temporal interpretation is assumed.
• Hist is the set of maximal chains in Tree w.r.t. ≤. Since Hist is completely
determined by Tree and ≤, it is not included into the structure of a model as a
separate component. Elements of Hist are called histories. The set of histories
containing a given moment m will be denoted Hm. The following set:
MH(M) = {(m,h) | m ∈ Tree, h ∈ Hm},
called the set of moment-history pairs, will be used to evaluate formulas of the
above language.
1Perhaps, “A is provable” will be an even better reading.
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• Choice is a function mapping Tree × Agent into 22
Hist
in such a way that for
any given j ∈ Agent and m ∈ Tree we have as Choice(m, j) (to be denoted
as Choicemj below) a partition of Hm. For a given h ∈ Hm we will denote by
Choicemj (h) the element of partition Choice
m
j containing h.
• Act is a function mapping MH(M) into 2Pol.
• R is a pre-order on Tree called epistemic accessibility.
• E is a function mapping Tree× Pol into 2Form.
• V is an evaluation function, mapping the set V ar into 2MH(M).
However, not all structures of the above described type are admitted as jstit models.
A number of additional restrictions needs to be satisfied. More precisely, we assume
satisfaction of the following constraints:
1. Historical connection:
(∀m,m1 ∈ Tree)(∃m2 ∈ Tree)(m2 ≤ m ∧m2 ≤ m1).
2. No backward branching:
(∀m,m1,m2 ∈ Tree)((m1 ≤ m ∧m2 ≤ m)→ (m1 ≤ m2 ∨m2 ≤ m1)).
3. No choice between undivided histories:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(m < m
′∧m′ ∈ h∩h′ → Choicemj (h) = Choice
m
j (h
′))
for every j ∈ Agent.
4. Independence of agents:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀f : Agent→ 2Hm)((∀j ∈ Agent)(f(j) ∈ Choicemj )⇒
⋂
j∈Agent
f(j) 6= ∅).
5. Monotonicity of evidence:
(∀t ∈ Pol)(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(R(m,m′)⇒ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m′, t)).
6. Evidence closure properties. For arbitrarym ∈ Tree, s, t ∈ Pol and A,B ∈ Form
it is assumed that:
(a) A→ B ∈ E(m, s) ∧ A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ B ∈ E(m, s× t);
(b) E(m, s) ∪ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m, s+ t).
(c) A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ t : A ∈ E(m, !t);
7. Expansion of presented proofs:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(m′ < m⇒ ∀h ∈ Hm(Act(m
′, h) ⊆ Act(m,h))).
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8. No new proofs guaranteed:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) ⊆
⋃
m′<m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h))).
9. Presenting a new proof makes histories divide:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(∃m
′ > m(m′ ∈ h ∩ h′)⇒ (Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′))).
10. Future always matters:
≤⊆ R.
11. Presented proofs are epistemically transparent:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(R(m,m′)⇒ (
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) ⊆
⋂
h′∈Hm′
(Act(m′, h′)))).
We offer some intuitive explanation for the above defined notion of jstit model. Due to
space limitations, we only explain the intuitions behind jstit models very briefly, and
we urge the reader to consult [5, Section 3] for a more comprehensive explanations,
whenever needed.
The components like Tree, ≤, Choice and V are inherited from stit logic, whereas
R and E come from justification logic. The only new component is Act. The intuition
behind the semantics is that Ag, our community of agents, is engaged in proving
activity and this proving activity consists in making proof polynomials public within
the community. One can think of a group of researchers, assembled before a whiteboard
in a conference room and putting the proofs they discover on this whiteboard. Function
Act gives out the current state of this whiteboard at any given moment under any given
history. The whole situation is somewhat idealized in that we assume that nothing ever
gets erased from the whiteboard, that there is always enough free space on it, and that
the agents do not send one another any private messages.
The numbered list of semantical constraints above then just builds on these in-
tuitions. Constraints 1–4 are borrowed from stit logic, constraints 5 and 6 are in-
herited from justification logic. Constraint 7 just says that nothing gets erased from
the whiteboard, constraint 8 says a new proof cannot spring into existence as a static
(i.e. moment-determinate) feature of the environment out of nothing, but rather has
to come as a result (or a by-product) of a previous activity. Constraint 9 is just a
corollary to constraint 3 in the richer environment of jstit models, constraint 10 says
that the possible future of the given moment is always epistemically relevant in this
moment, and constraint 11 says that the community knows everything that has firmly
made its way onto the whiteboard.
For the members of Form, we will assume the following inductively defined sat-
isfaction relation. For every jstit model M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 and for
every (m,h) ∈ PairM we stipulate that:
6 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
M,m, h |= p⇔ (m,h) ∈ V (p);
M,m, h |= [j]A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Choicemj (h))(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= ✷A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Hm)(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= KA⇔ ∀m′∀h′(R(m,m′)&h′ ∈ Hm′ ⇒M,m
′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= t:A⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&M,m, h |= KA;
M,m, h |= Prove(j, A)⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Choicemj (h))(∃t ∈ Act(m,h
′))(M,m, h′ |= t:A)&
&(∀s ∈ Pol)(∃h′′ ∈ Hm)(M,m, h |= s:A⇒ s /∈ Act(m,h
′′));
M,m, h |= Proven(A)⇔ (∃t ∈ Pol)(∀h′ ∈ Hm)(t ∈ Act(m,h
′)&M,m, h |= t:A)
In the above clauses we assume that p ∈ V ar; we also assume standard clauses for
Boolean connectives. Note that the satisfaction clause for Prove(j, A) consists of two
conjuncts, one stating that some proof of A must be presented at every history in a
given choice cell, and the other saying that no proof of A is presented in all histories
through the given moment. These conjuncts show some similarity to the conjuncts in
the satisfaction clause for the dstit operator, which are known in the existing literature
under the names of positive and negative condition, respectively. Following this usage,
we will name the first conjunct in the satisfaction clause for Prove(j, A) the positive
condition for Prove(j, A), and the second one the negative condition for Prove(j, A).
The intuitive motivation for the satisfaction clauses of Prove(j, A) and Proven(A) was
worked out in detail in [5] and we do not dwell on it here.
We further assume standard definitions for satisfiability and validity of formulas
and sets of formulas in the presented semantics.
Before we proceed to proving things about the defined system, we want to briefly
comment on how the above semantics relates to the semantics introduced in [5]. The
main difference is that the latter semantics uses two epistemic accessibility relations
R and Re with the constraint that R ⊆ Re, whereas in the jstit models as defined
above one only finds one such relation R, and this relation serves the functions of both
R and Re. Thus the semantics defined above arises from the more general semantics
presented in [5] as a particular case with R and Re being identified with one another.
The exact import of this additional restriction on the semantics presented in [5] is
not yet clear. It is known that on the level of pure justification logic identifying R and
Re does not change the set of validities (see, e.g. [2, Comment 6.5]). Our tentative
hypothesis would be, then, that imposing R = Re in the richer context of jstit logic
might be just as irrelevant as it is in justification logic. However, we have no proof of
this hypothesis at the moment, so it stands as an open problem.
The semantics just defined admits of no finitary strongly complete system since it
is not compact. Indeed, the set
{Proven(p)} ∪ {¬t:p | t ∈ Pol}
is unsatisfiable, even though every finite subset of it can be satisfied. Still, the main
result of this paper shows that we can do better than just weak completeness; in fact
we can show that also infinite consistent sets of formulas can be satisfied provided that
there is an infinite set of proof variables that do not occur in those formulas. Thus
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we get something considerably stronger than just weak completeness including also a
restricted form of the compactness theorem.
It is also worth noting that under the presented semantics some satisfiable for-
mulas cannot be satisfied over finite models. As an example of this phenomenon,
consider K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p). If M,m1, h |= K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p), then, by reflexivity of R, also
M,m1, h |= ✸p ∧ ✸¬p, which means that at least two different histories are running
through m1 inM. Therefore, m1 cannot be a ≤-maximal moment inM, so that there
is at least one moment m2 ∈ h such that m1 < m2. By the future always matters
constraint we get then that R(m1,m2), which, by transitivity of R, means that we
also have M,m2, h |= K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p). Iterating this construction ω times, we get a
countably infinite sequence of moments along h:
m1 < m2 < . . . < mn < . . . ,
showing that the moments in these sequence are pairwise different (by antisymmetry
of ≤) and that M is consequently an infinite model. Since M was chosen arbitrarily,
this shows that K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p) cannot be satisfied over finite jstit models. On the
other hand, K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p) is clearly satisfiable when one allows for infinite models.
One can consider, for example, a jstit model M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 for a
community {j} consisting of a single agent, setting:
Tree := {(a1, . . . , an) | ai ∈ {0, 1} for i ≤ n} ∪ {Λ},
where Λ is the empty sequence;
(a1, . . . , an) ≤ (b1, . . . , bk)⇔ (n ≤ k&(∀i ≤ n)(ai = bi)), Choice
m
j := Hm, Act(m,h) = ∅
for every m ∈ Tree and h ∈ Hm;
R :=≤, E(m, t) := Form,
for every m ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol;
V (p) := {(m,h) | (m, 1) ∈ h}, V (q) = ∅
provided q ∈ V ar \ {p}. It is straightforward to check then that with these settings we
get that M,Λ, h |= K(✸p ∧✸¬p) for an arbitrary history h over M.
Note also, that the same example shows that one cannot put a finite bound on the
length of histories in the models satisfying a given formula, so that what one might
have called a “finite history property” which is satisfied, e.g., by the canonical model
of the logic of dstit operator (see [3, Section 17C] for the definition) also fails for the
implicit jstit logic.
3 Axiomatic system and soundness
We consider the following set of axiomatic schemes:
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A full set of axioms for classical propositional logic (A0)
S5 axioms for ✷ and [j] for every j ∈ Agent (A1)
✷A→ [j]A for every j ∈ Agent (A2)
(✸[j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧✸[jn]An)→ ✸([j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [jn]An) (A3)
(s:(A→ B)→ (t:A→ (s× t):B) (A4)
t:A→ (!t:(t:A) ∧KA) (A5)
(s:A ∨ t:A)→ (s+ t):A (A6)
S4 axioms for K (A7)
KA→ ✷K✷A (A8)
Prove(j, A)→ (¬Proven(A) ∧ [j]Prove(j, A) ∧KA) (A9)
✷Prove(j, A)→ ✷Prove(i, A) (A10)
Proven(A)→ (KProven(A) ∧KA) (A11)
¬K(
n∨
l=1
〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al)) (A12)
¬Prove(j, A)→ 〈j〉(
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, A)) (A13)
The assumption is that in (A3) j1, . . . , jn are pairwise different.
To this set of axiom schemes we add the following rules of inference:
A,A→ B ⇒ B; (R1)
A⇒ KA; (R2)
If A is an instance of (A0)–(A13) and c ∈ Const, then infer c:A; (R3)
KA→ (¬Proven(B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(Bn))⇒
⇒ KA→ (
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, B1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, Bn)). (R4)
We call a jstit model M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 normal iff the following
condition is satisfied:
(∀c ∈ Const)(∀m ∈ Tree)({A |A is a substitution instance
of one of the schemes among (A1)–(A13)} ⊆ E(m, c)).
Our goal is now a restricted completeness theorem w.r.t. the class of normal models.
We start by establishing soundness, and we precede the soundness theorem with the
following rather straightforward technical claim:
Lemma 1. For every A ∈ Form and every t ∈ Pol, all of the formulas ✷A, KA, t:A
and Proven(A) are moment-determinate, that is to say, if α ∈ {✷A,KA, t:A,Proven(A)},
then for an arbitrary normal jstit model M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 and
m ∈ Tree, if h, h′ ∈ Hm, then:
M,m, h |= α⇔M,m, h′ |= α.
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Also, Boolean combinations of these formulas are moment-determinate.
Proof. For α = ✷A and α = KA it suffices to note that the semantical conditions for
satisfaction of KA and ✷A at a given (m,h) ∈ MH(M) in a given M have no free
occurrences of h. When we turn, further, to the corresponding condition for t:A, the
only free occurrence of h will be within the context M,m, h |= KA which was shown
to be moment-determinate. Similarly, in the satisfaction condition for Proven(A) the
only free occurrence of h is within a moment determinate context M,m, h |= t:A.
Of course, Boolean combinations of moment-determinate formulas must be moment-
determinate, too.
It follows from Lemma 1, that the truth of moment-determinate formulas at a given
moment-history pair only depends on the moment, so that we might as well omit the
histories when discussing satisfaction of such formulas and write M,m |= KA instead
of M,m, h |= KA, etc.
Establishing soundness mostly reduces to a routine check that every axiom is valid
and that rules preserve validity. We treat the less obvious cases in some detail:
Theorem 1. Every instance of (A1)–(A13) is valid over the class of normal jstit
models. Every application of rules (R1)–(R4) to formulas which are valid over the
class of normal jstit models yileds a formula which is valid over the class of normal
jstit models.
Proof. First, note that if M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 is a normal jstit model,
then 〈Tree,≤, Choice, V 〉 is a model of stit logic. Therefore, axioms (A0)–(A3), which
were copy-pasted from the standard axiomatization of dstit logic (see, e.g. [3, Ch. 17])
must be valid. Second, note that ifM = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 is a normal jstit
model, then 〈Tree,≤, Act, R, E〉 is what is called in [2, p. 1067] a frame for a Fitting
justification model with the form of constant specification defined by (R3)2. This
means that also all of the (A4)–(A7) must be valid, whereas (R1)–(R3) must preserve
validity. The validity of other elements of the above-presented axiomatic system will be
motivated below in some detail. In what follows, M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉
will always stand for an arbitrary normal jstit model, and (m,h) for an arbitrary
element of MH(M).
As for (A8), assume for reductio thatM,m |= KA∧¬✷K✷A. ThenM,m, h |= KA
and alsoM,m 6|= ✷K✷A. The latter means that for some h′ ∈ Hm we haveM,m 6|= K✷A.
Therefore, there must be some m′ ∈ Tree such that R(m,m′) and some g ∈ Hm′ such
that M,m′, g 6|= ✷A, whence for some g′ ∈ Hm′ we will have M,m′, g′ 6|= A. Since
R(m,m′), this means that KA must fail at (m,h) in M, a contradiction.
We consider next (A9). Assume that Prove(j, A) is true at (m,h) inM. Note that
the negative condition for Prove(j, A) at (m,h) is logically equivalent to the negation
of the satisfaction condition for Proven(A), which means that ¬Proven(A) must be
true at (m,h) in M. Further, since clearly h ∈ Choicemj (h) and thus Choice
m
j (h)
cannot be empty, it follows from the positive condition for Prove(j, A) that for some
t ∈ Pol we will haveM,m, h |= t:A, and therefore, by validity of (A5),M,m, h |= KA.
Finally, note that since Choicemj is a partition of Hm, then for any h
′ ∈ Choicemj (h),
2But note, that in [2] they do not include E in justification frames; however, this is of no consequence
for the present setting.
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if h′′ ∈ Choicemj (h
′), then h′′ ∈ Choicemj (h). Therefore, since the positive condition
for Prove(j, A) is satisfied at (m,h), there must be some t ∈ Pol such that both
t ∈ Act(m,h′′) andM,m |= t:A. Therefore, the positive condition for Prove(j, A) will
be satisfied at (m,h′) for every h′ ∈ Choicemj (h). As for the negative condition, recall
that it is equivalent to the negation of the satisfaction condition for Proven(j, A) and
the latter is, by Lemma 1, moment-determinate. Therefore, the negative condition for
Prove(j, A) must be moment-determinate as well, and, once satisfied at a given (m,h),
it will be satisfied at every history through m. Therefore, once we have Prove(j, A)
true at (m,h) in M, we must also have M,m, h |= [j]Prove(j, A).
The next axiom is (A10). If ✷Prove(j, A) is true at (m,h) in M, this means
that Prove(j, A) is true at (m,h′) in M for every h′ ∈ Hm. Now, take an arbitrary
such h′. We know that the negative condition for Prove(i, A) is the same as for
Prove(j, A), and is therefore satisfied at (m,h′). As for the positive condition, assume
that h′′ ∈ Choicemi (h
′). We know that Prove(j, A) is true at (m,h′′), therefore, since
h′′ is obviously in Choicemj (h
′′), for some t ∈ Pol we must have both t ∈ Act(m,h′′) and
M,m |= t:A. Thus the positive condition for Prove(i, A) at (m,h′) is satisfied as well.
Since h′ was chosen as an arbitrary history through m, this means that ✷Prove(i, A)
must be satisfied at (m,h) in M.
We now take up (A11). If Proven(A) is true at m in M, then there is a t ∈ Pol
such that t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
Act(m,h) and t:A is true at m. By validity of (A5), we im-
mediately get that M,m |= KA. Further, the fact that t:A is true at m means that
A ∈ E(m, t). Now, assume that m′ ∈ Tree is such that R(m,m′). By the epistemic
transparency of presented proofs constraint we know that t ∈
⋂
h′∈Hm′
Act(m′, h′). By
monotonicity of evidence, we know that A ∈ E(m′, t). By the S4 reasoning for K we
know that M,m′ |= KA. Summing up, we must have Proven(A) true at m′, and
since m′ was chosen as an arbitrary R-successor of m, this means that we also have
M,m |= KProven(A).
To prove the validity of (A12) over the class of normal jstit models, we proceed by
induction on n ≥ 1.
Basis. n = 1. Assume, for reductio, that M,m |= K〈K〉✸Prove(j1, A1). Then,
by validity of (A7), M,m |= 〈K〉✸Prove(j1, A1). Therefore, for some m′ ∈ Tree
such that R(m,m′), we must have M,m′ |= ✸Prove(j1, A1). The latter, in turn,
means that for some h′ ∈ Hm′ we will have M,m′, h′ |= Prove(j1, A1). We know
then that m′ must have some <-successors, where < is the irreflexive companion of
≤ in M. Indeed, if m′ were a ≤-maximal moment, then we would have Hm′ = {h′},
that is to say, h′ would be the only history passing through m′. But then, of course
h′ ∈ Choicem
′
j1
(h′), therefore, for some t ∈ Pol we would have then both t ∈ Act(m′, h′)
and M,m′ |= t:A by the positive condition for Prove(j1, A1) at (m′, h′). But then,
given that Hm′ = {h′}, this would mean that t ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
Act(m′, g) so that the
negative condition for Prove(j1, A1) at (m
′, h′) would be violated, contradicting our
assumption that M,m′, h′ |= Prove(j1, A1).
Therefore, we can choose a moment m′′ such that both m′′ > m′ and h′ passes
through m′′; consider then Hm′′ . All the histories passing through m
′′ are pairwise
undivided at m′, therefore, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide con-
straint we must have Act(m′, g) = Act(m′, g′) for any g, g′ ∈ Hm′′ . We also know that,
since M,m′, h′ |= Prove(j1, A1), there must be a t ∈ Pol such that t ∈ Act(m′, h′)
and M,m′ |= t:A. Since h′ ∈ Hm′′ , this further means that t ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′′
Act(m′, g).
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By the expansion of presented proofs constraint, we may infer from the latter that
t ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′′
Act(m′′, g). By the future always matters constraint, we know that, since
m′ < m′′, then we must have R(m′,m′′), whence, given that M,m′ |= t:A, we must
also have M,m′′ |= t:A. Summing this up with t ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′′
Act(m′′, g), we get
that M,m′′ |= Proven(A), which, by (A11), means that M,m′′ |= KProven(A),
whence further, by (A8), M,m′′ |= ✷K✷Proven(A). Validity of (A1) yields then
M,m′′ |= K✷Proven(A). Note, further, that Proven(A) → ¬Prove(j, A) must be
valid as a consequence of (A9), and by S5 reasoning for ✷ and S4 reasoning for K we
get from this the validity of:
K✷Proven(A)→ K✷¬Prove(j, A).
The latter means that M,m′′ |= K✷¬Prove(j, A), and, pushing the negation outside,
M,m′′ |= ¬〈K〉✸Prove(j, A). It remains then to note we already established both
R(m,m′) and R(m,m′′) so that by transitivity of R we get that R(m,m′′). Therefore,
the consequence that M,m′′ |= ¬〈K〉✸Prove(j, A) turns out to be in contradiction
with our initial hypothesis that M,m |= K〈K〉✸Prove(j1, A1). The obtained contra-
diction shows that we must have ¬K〈K〉✸Prove(j1, A1) true throughout any given
normal jstit model for any A1 ∈ Form and j1 ∈ Ag.
Induction step. Assume that for a k ≥ 1 the validity of all instances of the scheme
¬K(
∨k
l=1〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al)) has been successfully shown and assume that n = k + 1.
Assume, further, that:
M,m |= K(
k+1∨
l=1
〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al)).
Then, by S4 reasoning for K, we know that
M,m |=
k+1∨
l=1
〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al),
so that at least one of 〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al) must be true at m; suppose, wlog, that
l = 1. Then, arguing as in the base case, we find a moment m′′ such that R(m,m′′)
and M,m′′ |= K✷¬Prove(j1, A1). Applying to this S4 reasoning for K, we get
further that M,m′′ |= KK✷¬Prove(j1, A1), and, pushing out the negation, that
M,m′′ |= K¬〈K〉✸Prove(j1, A1). Since we have R(m,m′′), it follows that we also
have:
M,m′′ |= K(
k+1∨
l=1
〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al)).
From the latter two facts, S4 reasoning for K yields that:
M,m′′ |= K(
k+1∨
l=2
〈K〉✸Prove(jl, Al)),
contradicting the induction hypothesis. The obtained contradiction shows the validity
of (A12) for n = k + 1.
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The last axiom is (A13). So, assume that M,m, h |= ¬Prove(j, A). We have to
consider then two cases.
Case 1. The negative condition for Prove(j, A) fails at (m,h). Then we must have
M,m, h |= Proven(A), and by (A9) we know that M,m, h |=
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, A),
thus also M,m, h |= 〈j〉
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, A) by S5 reasoning for [j].
Case 2. The negative condition for Prove(j, A) holds at (m,h). Then, since we
have M,m, h |= ¬Prove(j, A), the positive condition for Prove(j, A) at (m,h) must
fail. Therefore, we can choose a g ∈ Choicemj (h) such that for no t ∈ Pol do we have
both t ∈ Act(m, g) and M,m |= t:A. Note, further, that g ∈ Choicemi (g) for every
i ∈ Ag, and therefore the positive condition for every formula of the form Prove(i, A)
fails at (m, g). Therefore, we must have M,m, g |=
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, A), and, since
g ∈ Choicemj (h), also M,m, h |= 〈j〉
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, A) as desired.
It only remains to show that (R4) preserves validity over normal jstit models. As-
sume thatKA→ (¬Proven(B1)∨. . .∨¬Proven(Bn)) is valid over normal jstit models,
and assume also that we have:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ (
∨
j∈Ag
Prove(j, B1) ∧ . . . ∧
∨
j∈Ag
Prove(j, Bn)).
This means that we can choose jB1 , . . . , jBn ∈ Ag in such a way that we end up having:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ Prove(jB1 , B1) ∧ . . . ∧ Prove(jBn , Bn).
We can now re-use the manner of reasoning employed above for the base case of (A12).
More precisely, sinceM,m, h |= Prove(jB1 , B1) then m must have some <-successors,
otherwise h would be the unique history throughm. Then, if there existed t ∈ Pol such
that both t ∈ Act(m,h) and M,m |= t:B1, the negative condition for Prove(jB1 , B1)
at (m,h) would be violated. On the other hand, if there were no such t, then the
positive condition for Prove(jB1 , B1) at (m,h) would be violated.
Since m is not a ≤-maximal moment in Tree, then we can choose an m′ ∈ Tree
such that both m′ > m and h ∈ Hm′ . All the histories passing through m′ are
pairwise undivided at m, therefore, by the presenting a new proof makes histories
divide constraint we must have Act(m, g) = Act(m, g′) for any g, g′ ∈ Hm′ . We also
know that, since
M,m, h |= Prove(jB1 , B1) ∧ . . . ∧ Prove(jBn , Bn),
there must be t1, . . . , tn ∈ Pol such that t1, . . . , tn ∈ Act(m,h) and M,m |= ti :Bi for
all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since h ∈ Hm′ , this further means that
t1, . . . , tn ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
Act(m, g). By the expansion of presented proofs constraint, we
may infer from the latter that t1, . . . , tn ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
Act(m′, g). By the future always
matters constraint, we know that, since m < m′, then we must have R(m,m′), whence,
given thatM,m |= ti :Bi for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we must also haveM,m′ |= ti :Bi
for all such i. Summing this up with t1, . . . , tn ∈
⋂
g∈Hm′
Act(m′, g), we get that
M,m′ |= Proven(B1) ∧ . . . ∧ Proven(Bn).
Further, we know that M,m |= KA, so that by R(m,m′) and S4 properties of K we
must also have M,m′ |= KA. Thus we get that KA ∧ Proven(B1) ∧ . . . ∧ Prove(Bn)
is satisfied at m′ which is in contradiction with the assumed validity of
KA→ (¬Proven(B1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(Bn)).
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We then define a proof in the above-presented axiomatic system as a finite sequence
of formulas such that every formula in it is either an axiom or is obtained from earlier
elements of the sequence by one of the inference rules. A proof is a proof of its last
formula. If an A ∈ Form is provable in our system, we will write ⊢ A.
The presence in our system of the rules like (R2) and especially (R4) complicates
the issue of finding the right notion of an inference from premises and the right format
for Deduction Theorem. Given that these problems lie beyond the scope of the present
paper, we will take a little detour and will base our definition of consistency of a set
of formulas upon the notion of provable formula, rather than just saying that a set
Γ ⊆ Form is inconsistent iff ⊥ is derivable from Γ. Moreover, due to the form of our
main result we need to relativize our notions to sets of proof variables occurring in a
given set of formulas.
More precisely, assume that Z ⊆ PV ar. Then we can define PolZ and FormZ as
the sets of proof polynomials (resp. formulas) containing proof variables from Z only.
Note that this imposes no restrictions on proof constants, so that the set of closed proof
polynomials is contained in PolZ for every Z ⊆ PV ar. Now, for a given Z ⊆ PV ar
we say that Γ ⊆ FormZ is a set of formulas in Z. We say that Γ is inconsistent iff for
some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we have ⊢ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → ⊥, and we say that Γ is consistent
iff it is not inconsistent. Γ is maxiconsistent in Z iff Γ ⊆ FormZ and no consistent
subset of FormZ properly extends Γ.
Even with this slightly non-standard definition of inconsistency, we can still do
many familiar things, e.g. extend consistent sets with new formulas and eventually
make them maxiconsistent. More precisely, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 2. Let Z ⊆ PV ar, let Γ ⊆ FormZ be consistent, and let A,B ∈ FormZ .
Then:
1. There exists a ∆ ⊆ FormZ such that ∆ is maxiconsistent in Z and Γ ⊆ ∆.
2. If Γ is maxiconsistent in Z, then exactly one element of {A,¬A} is in Γ.
3. If Γ is maxiconsistent in Z, then A ∨B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ).
4. If Γ is maxiconsistent in Z and A, (A→ B) ∈ Γ, then B ∈ Γ.
5. If Γ is maxiconsistent in Z, then A ∧B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ).
Proof. (Part 1) Just as in the standard case, we enumerate the elements of FormZ as
A1, . . . , An, . . . and form the sequence of sets Γ1, . . . ,Γn, . . . , such that Γ1 := Γ and for
every natural i ≥ 1:
Γi+1 :=
{
Γi, if Γi ∪ {Ai} is inconsistent;
Γi ∪ {Ai}, otherwise.
We now define ∆ :=
⋃
i≥1 Γi. Of course, we have Γ ⊆ ∆, and, moreover, ∆ is maxicon-
sistent in Z. To see this, note that for every i ≥ 1 the set Γi is consistent by construc-
tion. Now, if ∆ is inconsistent, then there must be a valid implication from a finite con-
junction of formulas in ∆ to ⊥. These formulas must be mentioned in our numeration of
FormZ so that the valid implication in question can presented as ⊢ (Ai1∧. . .∧Ain)→ ⊥
for appropriate natural i1, . . . , in. Since all of Ai1 , . . . , Ain are in ∆, we must have, by
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the construction of Γ1, . . . ,Γn, . . . , that Ai1 , . . . , Ain ∈ Γmax(i1,...,in). But then this
latter set must be inconsistent which contradicts our construction.
Further, if some consistent Ξ ⊆ FormZ is such that ∆ ⊂ Ξ, then let An ∈ Ξ \∆.
We must have then Γn ∪ {An} inconsistent, but we also have Γn ∪ {An} ⊆ Ξ, which
implies inconsistency of Ξ, in contradiction to our assumptions. Therefore, ∆ is not
only consistent, but also maxiconsistent in Z.
(Part 2)We cannot have both A and ¬A in Γ, since we have, of course, ⊢ (A∧¬A)→ ⊥.
If, on the other hand, neither A, nor ¬A is in Γ, then both Γ∪{A} and Γ∪{¬A} must
be inconsistent, so that for some B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Γ we will have:
⊢ (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn ∧A)→ ⊥,
whereas for some C1, . . . , Ck ∈ Γ we will have:
⊢ (C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ck ∧ ¬A)→ ⊥,
whence we get, using (A0) and (R1):
⊢ (C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ck)→ A,
and further:
⊢ (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn ∧C1 ∧ . . . ∧Ck)→ ⊥,
so that Γ turns out to be inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions.
(Part 3) Assume (A ∨ B) ∈ Γ. If neither A nor B are in Γ, then, by Part 2, both
¬A and ¬B are in Γ. Using (A0) and (R1) we get that:
⊢ ((A ∨B) ∧ ¬A ∧ ¬B)→ ⊥,
showing that Γ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. In the other direction, if,
say A ∈ Γ and (A ∨B) /∈ Γ, then, by Part 2, we must have ¬(A ∨B) ∈ Γ. Using (A0)
and (R1) we get that:
⊢ (¬(A ∨B) ∧A)→ ⊥,
showing, again, that Γ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. The case when
B ∈ Γ is similar.
Parts 4 and 5 are similar to Part 3.
Remark. Note that one can recover the notion of non-relativized maxiconsistent
set and its properties just by setting Z := PV ar. But this will not be needed in the
present paper.
We are now prepared to formulate our main result:
Theorem 2. Let X ⊆ PV ar be such that PV ar \ X is countably infinite. Then an
arbitrary Γ ⊆ FormX is consistent iff it is satisfiable in a normal jstit model.
The rest of the paper is mainly concerned with proving Theorem 2. One part of it
we have, of course, right away, as a consequence of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. Let X ⊆ PV ar be such that PV ar\X is countably infinite. If Γ ⊆ FormX
is satisfiable in a normal jstit model, then Γ is consistent.
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Proof. Let Γ ⊆ FormX be satisfiable in a normal jstit model so that we have, say
M,m, h |= Γ for some (m,h) ∈MH(M). If Γ were inconsistent this would mean that
for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we would have ⊢ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → ⊥. By Theorem 1, this
would mean that:
M,m, h |= (A1 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ ⊥,
whence clearlyM,m, h |= ⊥, which is impossible. Therefore, Γ must be consistent.
Before we move further, we mention some theorems in the above axiom system to
be used later in the proof of the main result:
Lemma 3. The following holds for every A ∈ Form, t ∈ Pol, x ∈ PV ar, and j ∈ Ag:
1. ⊢ t:A→ ✷t:A;
2. ⊢ Proven(A)→ ✷Proven(A);
3. 6⊢ x:A;
4. ⊢ (Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A))→ [j](Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A));
5. ⊢ KA→ ✷KA.
Proof. (Part 1) We have:
t:A→!t:t:A (by (A5))
→ Kt:A (by (A5))
→ ✷K✷t:A (by (A8))
→ K✷t:A (by (A1))
→ ✷t:A (by (A7))
Our theorem follows then by transitivity of implication.
(Part 2) Again, we proceed by building a chain of implications:
Proven(A)→ KProven(A) (by (A11))
→ ✷K✷Proven(A) (by (A8))
→ K✷Proven(A) (by (A1))
→ ✷Proven(A) (by (A7))
(Part 3). Take an arbitrary normal jstit modelM = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉
and consider another model M′ = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E ′, V 〉 such that:
E ′(m, t) =
{
E(m, t), if t 6= x;
∅, if t = x.
It is straightforward to verify that M′ is again a normal jstit model, and we obviously
have M′,m 6|= x:A for every m ∈ Tree. Therefore, x:A is not valid, and, by Theorem
1, cannot be provable in our system.
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(Part 4). We chain the implications as follows:
(Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A)) → ([j]Prove(j, A) ∧ ✷¬✷Prove(j, A)) (by (A1) and (A9))
→ ([j]Prove(j, A) ∧ [j]¬✷Prove(j, A)) (by (A2))
→ [j](Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A)) (by (A1))
(Part 5). By S5 properties of✷ and S4 properties ofK, we clearly have ⊢ ✷K✷A→ ✷KA.
Part 5 follows then by (A8) and transitivity of implication.
4 The canonical model
The main aim of the present section is to prove the inverse of Corollary 1. The
method used is a variant of the canonical model technique, but, due to the complexity
of the case, we do not define our model in one full sweep. Rather, we proceed piecewise,
defining elements of the model one by one, and checking the relevant constraints as
soon, as we have got enough parts of the model in place. The last subsection proves
the truth lemma for the defined model.
Throughout this section we fix an X ⊆ PV ar such that PV ar \ X is countably
infinite. We then present3 the set of proof variables in the following form:
PV ar = X ∪ Y ∪W ∪ U ∪ {z},
where:
Y := {y(i,A) | i ∈ Ag,A ∈ FormX},
W := {wA | A ∈ FormX},
U := {uA | A ∈ FormX}.
Since Form is countably infinite and Ag is finite, this presentation of PV ar is well-
defined. Also throughout this section we will use M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉
as a fixed notation for our canonical model.
The ultimate building blocks of M we will call elements. Before going on with the
definition ofM, we define what these elements are and explore some of their properties.
Definition 1. An element is a sequence of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α for some natural
n ≥ 1 such that:
• α ∈ {↑, ↓};
• For every i ≤ n, Γi is maxiconsistent in X;
• For every i < n, for all A ∈ FormX , if KA ∈ Γi, then KA ∈ Γi+1;
• For every i such that 1 < i ≤ n, for all j ∈ Ag and A ∈ FormX , if Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1,
then Proven(A) ∈ Γi;
3More precisely, we divide PV ar\X into three countably infinite subsets plus a single proof variable
which we will denote z. For the first of these three subsets (denoted Y ) we fix a bijection onto the
Cartesian product of Ag and Form, for the other two (denoted W and U) we fix bijections onto Form.
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• For every i such that 1 < i ≤ n, for all A ∈ FormX , it is true that
K✷¬Prove(j, A) ∈ Γi.
In other words, elements are sequences of subsets of FormX of a rather special
kind, which are signed by either ↓ or ↑. The (purely technical) reason for including
these arrows in the structure of elements is that one normally needs at least two copies
of one element in order to get the truth conditions for formulas like ✷Prove(j, A) right.
Both ↓ or ↑ mainly become relevant after we define Act and for most other purposes
they can be more or less overlooked.
We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Whenever (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α is an element, then, for some Γn+1 ⊆ FormX ,
the sequence (Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1)α is also an element.
Proof. Assume (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α is an element. We have two cases to consider:
Case 1. n = 1. Then consider the set:
∆ := {KA | KA ∈ Γ1} ∪ {Proven(A) | (∃j ∈ Ag)(Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1)}∪
∪ {K✷¬Prove(j, A) | A ∈ Form}.
We show that ∆ is consistent. Of course, the set {KA | KA ∈ Γ1} is consistent
since it is a subset of Γ1 and the latter is assumed to be consistent.
Further, if the set
∆′ := {KA | KA ∈ Γ1} ∪ {Proven(A) | (∃j ∈ Ag)(Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1)}
is inconsistent, this would mean, wlog, that for some B1, . . . , Bk, C1, . . . , Cl ∈ Form
and j1, . . . , jl ∈ Ag such that KB1, . . . ,KBk and Prove(j1, C1), . . . , P rove(jl, Cl) are
in Γ1, we have that:
⊢ (KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBk)→ (¬Proven(C1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(Cl)),
whence, by (A7):
⊢ K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk)→ (¬Proven(C1) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Proven(Cl)),
and further, by (R4):
⊢ K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk)→ (
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, C1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, Cl)).
Since the latter formula is in X it is, of course, in Γ1 by its maxiconsistency in X .
Also, given Lemma 2, K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk) is in Γ1 by the fact that KB1, . . . ,KBk ∈ Γ1,
(A7), and the fact that Γ1 is maxiconsistent in X . Therefore, we get:∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, C1) ∨ . . . ∨
∧
j∈Ag
¬Prove(j, Cl) ∈ Γ1
by Lemma 2.4. By Lemma 2.3, we further get that for some r such that 1 ≤ r ≤ l all of
the formulas ¬Prove(j, Cr), where j ∈ Ag are in Γ1. By the choice of C1, . . . , Cl this
makes Γ1 inconsistent and we get a contradiction, which shows that ∆
′ is consistent.
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Assume, further, that ∆ is inconsistent. In view of consistency of ∆′ this will mean
that for someKB1, . . . ,KBk in Γ1, and some Proven(C1), . . . , P roven(Cl) from ∆
′\Γ1
and some Prove(j1, D1), . . . , P rove(jr, Dr) ∈ Form, we will have:
⊢ (KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBk∧Proven(C1) ∧ . . . ∧ Proven(Cl))→
→ (〈K〉✸Prove(j1, D1) ∨ . . . ∨ 〈K〉✸Prove(jr , Dr)).
From the latter validity, by (R2) and (A7) we get that:
⊢ K(KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBk∧Proven(C1) ∧ . . . ∧ Proven(Cl))→
→ K(〈K〉✸Prove(j1, D1) ∨ . . . ∨ 〈K〉✸Prove(jr, Dr)),
whence, by (A12), we obtain:
⊢ K(KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBk ∧ Proven(C1) ∧ . . . ∧ Proven(Cl))→ ⊥,
and, by (A7), and (A11) we further obtain:
⊢ (KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBk ∧ Proven(C1) ∧ . . . ∧ Proven(Cl))→ ⊥,
showing that ∆′ must be inconsistent. This makes up a contradiction showing that ∆
must be consistent.
Since ∆ is shown to be consistent, then, by Lemma 2.1, it is also extendable to a
set Γ2 which is maxiconsistent in X . By the choice of ∆, this means that (Γ1,Γ2)α
must be an element.
Case 2. n > 1. Then it is easy to see that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn)α is an element.
The structure of elements will be important in what follows. If ξ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α
is an element, then its initial segment is any element τ of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γk)α with
k ≤ n. If, moreover, k < n, then τ is a proper initial segment of ξ, and if k = n − 1,
then τ is the greatest proper initial segment of ξ. Moreover, we define n to be the length
of ξ. Thus, any element of length 1 has no proper initial segments. Furthermore, we
define that Γn is the end element of ξ and write Γn = end(ξ).
We now define the canonical model using elements as our building blocks. We start
by defining the following relation ≡ between elements of equal length. For the elements
of length 1 we set:
(Γ)α ≡ (∆)β ⇔ (∀A ∈ FormX)(✷A ∈ Γ⇒ A ∈ ∆);
and for the elements of greater length we set:
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)α ≡(∆1, . . . ,∆n,∆n+1)β ⇔
⇔ (Γ1 = ∆1 ∧ . . . ∧ Γn = ∆n ∧ α = β ∧ (Γn+1)α ≡ (∆n+1)β).
It is routine to check that ≡ is an equivalence relation given that ✷ is an S5 modal-
ity. We will denote the equivalence class of element (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α generated by ≡ by
[(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡. Since all the elements inside a given ≡-equvalence class are of the
same length, we may extend the notion of length to these classes setting that the length
of [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡ also equals n.
We now proceed to definitions of components for the canonical model.
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4.1 Tree, ≤, and Hist
The first two components of the canonical model M are as follows:
• Tree is the set of ≡-equvalence classes of elements plus † and ‡ as additional
moments;
• We set that both † < m and m 6< † for every m ∈ Tree\ {†}. We further set that
‡ is only <-comparable to † (in which case we already have † < ‡), and for any
two ≡-equvalence classes of elements m and m′, we have that m < m′ iff there is
an element ξ ∈ m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element τ ∈ m′.
The relation ≤ is then defined as the reflexive companion to <.
Before we move on to the choice- and justifications-related components, let us pause
to check that the restraints imposed by our semantics on Tree and ≤ are satisfied:
Lemma 5. The relation ≤, as defined above, is a partial order on Tree, which satisfies
both historical connection and no backward branching constraints. Moreover, every
element in Tree, except for ‡, has at least one immediate <-successor.
Proof. Transitivity and reflexivity of ≤ are obvious. As for antisymmetry, assume that
we have both m < m′ and m′ < m. Then m and m′ must be equivalence classes of
elements. Let ξ ∈ m be a proper initial segment of every element in m′ and let τ ∈ m′
be a proper initial segment of every element in m. It follows that ξ is a proper initial
segment of τ and also τ is a proper initial segment of ξ, a contradiction.
Historical connection is satisfied since † is the ≤-least element of Tree. Let us prove
the absence of backward branching. Assume that we have both m ≤ m′′ and m′ ≤ m′′
but neither m ≤ m′ nor m′ ≤ m holds. This means that all the three moments
are pairwise different and none of them is either † or ‡, otherwise our assumptions
about them would be immediately falsified. Therefore, all the three moments are some
equivalence classes of elements and we also have m 6= m′, m < m′′ and m′ < m′′. So
let ξ ∈ m and τ ∈ m′ be such that both ξ and τ are proper initial segments of every
element in m′′. Then, since m 6= m′, ξ and τ must be different, hence either ξ must
be a proper initial segment of τ or τ must be a proper initial segment of ξ. Assume,
wlog, that ξ is a proper initial segment of τ . Then ξ is included into the greatest
proper initial segment of τ . Let τ ′ be any element in m′. It follows from the definition
of ≡ that all the elements within m′ share the same greatest proper initial segment,
therefore ξ must be a proper initial segment of τ ′ as well. It follows that m < m′,
contrary to our assumptions.
Consider the <-successors of a given m ∈ Tree. If m 6= ‡, then either m = †, or
m is an equivalence class of elements. If m = †, then take any Γ ⊆ FormX which
is maxiconsistent in X and any α ∈ {↑, ↓}. Then (Γ)α is an element and we have
† < [(Γ)α]≡. Moreover, no other moment can be in between them: this cannot be either
†, or ‡, or an equivalence class of elements (since the greatest proper initial segment
of (Γ)α is empty). If, on the other hand, m is an equivalence class of elements, then
assume that m = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡. By Lemma 4, we know that for some ∆ ⊆ Form,
the tuple (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α must be an element. But then we must have
[(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡ < [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α]≡,
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and again, no moments are strictly in between them since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α is the greatest
proper initial segment of (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α.
Moreover, it is easy to see that if m,m′ ∈ Tree are two equivalence classes of
elements, and m < m′, then the length of m is less than the length of m′, and if m′ is
an immediate <-successor of m, then length of m is the length of m′ minus one.
Before we move on, let us have a quick look into the structure of histories induced
by Tree and ≤. Lemma 5 shows that we must have the history (†, ‡) plus a bunch of
infinite histories of the form (†,m1, . . . ,mn, . . .), ordered in the type of ω, where, for
n ≥ 1, mn is an equivalence class of elements of length n and every next element is
the immediate <-successor of the previous one. Every such infinite history we can also
represent in the form (†, ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . .) such that for every n ≥ 1:
• ξn ∈ mn;
• ξn is the greatest proper initial segment of ξn+1.
Moreover, one can show that such a representation, for a given history of the form
(†,m1, . . . ,mn, . . .), is unique. Indeed, suppose that (†, ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . .) and (†, ξ′1, . . . , ξ
′
n, . . .)
are two different representations for (†,m1, . . . ,mn, . . .). Then let i ≥ 1 be the first
natural number such that ξi 6= ξ′i. Consider mi+1. We have ξi+1, ξ
′
i+1 ∈ mi+1 so that
ξi+1 ≡ ξ′i+1. Since ξi and ξ
′
i are the greatest proper initial segments of ξi+1, ξ
′
i+1,
respectively, the greatest proper initial segments of ξi+1 and ξ
′
i+1 are non-empty and,
by ξi+1 ≡ ξ′i+1, must coincide, which cannot be the case since ξi 6= ξ
′
i.
Therefore, if h = (†,m1, . . . ,mn, . . .) is a history in Tree and (†, ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . .) is
the unique representation of h as a sequence of elements, we define mn ∩ h to be ξn.
All the above statements admit of an inversion. Not only can every history be
uniquely represented as a sequence of elements, but also every sequence of elements
of an appropriate form represents a unique history in M. Not only is every intersec-
tion of an equivalence class of elements and a history an element in this class, but
also, conversely, every element defines the intersection of at least one history with the
equivalence class induced by this element. More precisely:
Lemma 6. The following statements are true:
1. Fix a sequence (†, ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . .) where all of ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . are elements and, for
every natural n, ξn is the greatest proper initial segment of ξn+1. Then there is
a unique history h = (†,m1, . . . ,mn, . . .) in M such that for all natural n it is
true that ξn ∈ mn (thus ξn = mn ∩ h).
2. Let ξ be an element. Then there is at least one history h ∈ H[ξ]≡ such that
[ξ]≡ ∩ h = ξ.
Proof. As for Part 1, consider (†, [ξ1]≡, . . . , [ξn]≡, . . .); it is obviously a history in M
and we also have ξn ∈ [ξn]≡ for all natural n.
As for Part 2, we have to consider two cases.
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Case 1. The length of ξ equals 1, so that ξ = (Γ)α for appropriate Γ and α. Then
we know, by the proof of Lemma 4 above, that for some ∆ ⊆ FormX the sequence:
ξ1 := ξ = (Γ)α;
ξ2 := (Γ,∆)α;
. . . ;
ξn+1 := (Γ,∆, . . . ,∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
)α;
. . . ;
is a sequence of elements in which every element is the greatest proper initial segment
of the next one. Therefore, by Part 1, there must be a history h in M such that
h = (†, [ξ1]≡, . . . , [ξn]≡, . . .) and also ξ = ξ1 = [ξ1]≡ ∩ h.
Case 2. The length of ξ is greater than 1, so that ξ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α for appropriate
n > 1, Γ1, . . . ,Γn and α. Then we define the following sequence of elements:
ξ1 := (Γ1)α;
ξ2 := (Γ1,Γ2)α;
. . . ;
ξn := ξ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α;
ξn+1 := (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn)α;
. . . ;
ξn+k := (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn, . . . ,Γn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
)α;
. . . .
Again, it is easy to see that every element in this sequence is the greatest proper
initial segment of the next one, so that, arguing as in the previous case, we get that
h = (†, [ξ1]≡, . . . , [ξn]≡, . . . , [ξn+k]≡, . . .) is a history in M and ξ = ξn = [ξn]≡ ∩ h.
4.2 Choice
We now define the choice structures of our canonical model:
• Choicemj = Hm, if m ∈ {†, ‡};
• Choicemj (h) = {h
′ | h′ ∈ Hm, (∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(h∩m)⇒ A ∈ end(h′∩m))},
if m is an equivalence class of elements.
Since for every j ∈ Ag, [j] is an S5-modality, Choice induces a partition on Hm for
every given m ∈ Tree. We check that the choice function verifies the relevant semantic
constraints:
Lemma 7. The tuple 〈Tree,≤, Choice〉, as defined above, verifies both the indepen-
dence of agents and the no choice between undivided histories constraints.
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Proof. We first tackle no choice between undivided histories. Consider a moment m
and two histories h, h′ ∈ Hm such that h and h′ are undivided at m. Since the agents’
choices are only non-vacuous at moments represented by equivalence classes of elements,
we may safely assume that m is such a class. Since h and h′ are undivided at m, this
means that there is a moment m′ such that m < m′ and m′ is shared by h and h′.
Hence we know that also m′ is some equivalence class of elements. Suppose the length
of m is n and the length of m′ is n′. Then n < n′, also h ∩m is the initial segment of
length n of h ∩m′, and similarly, h′ ∩m is the initial segment of length n of h′ ∩m′.
But both h ∩m′ and h′ ∩m′ are, by definition, in m′, therefore, they must share the
greatest proper initial segment. Hence, their initial segments of length n must coincide
as well, and we must have h∩m = h′ ∩m, whence end(h∩m) = end(h′ ∩m). Now, if
j ∈ Ag and [j]A ∈ end(h∩m), then, by (A1) and maxiconsistency of end(h∩m) in X ,
we will have also A ∈ end(h ∩m) = end(h′ ∩m), and thus h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), so that
Choicemj (h) = Choice
m
j (h
′) since Choice is a partition of Hm.
Consider, next, the independence of agents. Let m ∈ Tree and let f be a function
on Ag such that ∀j ∈ Ag(f(j) ∈ Choicemj ). We are going to show that in this case⋂
j∈Ag f(j) 6= ∅. If m ∈ {†, ‡}, then this is obvious, since every agent will have a
vacuous choice. We treat the case when m is an equivalence class of elements. Assume
that m = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1)α]≡. We have two cases to consider:
Case 1. n = 0. By (A1) we know that there is a set ∆ of formulas of the form ✷A
which is shared by all sets of the form end(ξ) with ξ ∈ m in the sense that if ξ ∈ m,
then ✷A ∈ end(ξ) iff ✷A ∈ ∆. By the same axiom scheme and Lemma 6.2, we also
know that for every j ∈ Ag there is set ∆j of formulas of the form [j]A which is shared
by all sets of the form end(ξ) such that ∃h(h ∈ f(j) ∧ ξ = m ∩ h). More precisely:
ξ ∈ m⇒ (∃h(h ∈ f(j) ∧ ξ = m ∩ h)⇔ (∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(ξ)⇔ [j]A ∈ ∆j)).
We now consider the set ∆ ∪
⋃
{∆j | j ∈ Ag} and show its consistency. Indeed, if
this set is inconsistent, then, wlog, we would have a provable formula of the following
form:
⊢ (✷A ∧
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj)→ ⊥. (1)
But then, choose for every j ∈ Ag an element ξj ∈ m such that
(∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(ξj) ⇔ [j]A ∈ ∆j). This is possible, since we may simply
choose an arbitrary hj ∈ f(j) and set ξj := m ∩ hj . Then we will have [j]Aj ∈ ξj for
every j ∈ Ag. Next, consider Γ1. Since m = [(Γ1)α]≡ and ✷ is an S5-modality, we
must have:
{✸[j]Aj ∈ Ag} ⊆ Γ1,
whence, by Lemma 2.5: ∧
j∈Ag
✸[j]Aj ∈ Γ1,
and further, by (A3) and Lemma 2.4:
✸
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj ∈ Γ1.
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Also, by definition of ∆ and the fact that m = [(Γ1)α]≡, we get successively:
✷A ∈ Γ1,
then, by Lemma 2.5:
✷A ∧✸
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj ∈ Γ1,
and finally, by the fact that ✷ is an S5-modality:
✸(✷A ∧
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj) ∈ Γ1. (2)
From (1), together with (2), it follows by S5 reasoning for ✷ that ✸⊥ ∈ Γ1, so
that, again by S5 properties of ✷ and Lemma 2.4, it follows that ⊥ ∈ Γ1, which is in
contradiction with maxiconsistency of Γ1 in X .
Hence ∆ ∪
⋃
{∆j | j ∈ Ag} is consistent, and since it is in X , we can extend it
to a set Ξ which is maxiconsistent in X . We now consider (Ξ)α which is obviously
an element, and since, moreover ∆ ⊆ Ξ, then also (Ξ)α ∈ m. By Lemma 6.2, we can
choose a history g such that (Ξ)α = g ∩m. We also know that for every j ∈ Ag, there
is a history hj ∈ f(j) such that hj ∩m = ξj by the choice of ξj . Therefore, for every
j ∈ Ag, Choicemj (hj) = f(j). Also, if [j]A ∈ end(ξj) = end(hj ∩m), then [j]A ∈ ∆j ,
hence [j]A ∈ Ξ = end(g ∩m), therefore, by (A1), A ∈ end(g ∩m). Thus we get that
g ∈
⋂
j∈Ag Choice
m
j (hj) =
⋂
j∈Ag fj so that the independence of agents is verified.
Case 2. n > 0. For the most part, we can re-use our reasoning from Case 1. We
again form the sets ∆, {∆j | j ∈ Ag} and Ξ, and consider element (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ)α ∈ m.
We then choose a history g ∈ Hm for which we have (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ)α = m ∩ g and
show that g ∈
⋂
j∈Ag Choice
m
j (hj) =
⋂
j∈Ag fj.
The only new ingredient is that now seeing that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ)α is in fact an el-
ement is much less trivial and has to be argued separately. We show this as follows.
If KA ∈ Γn, then KA ∈ Γn+1 by definition of an element. But then ✷KA ∈ Γn+1
by Lemma 3.5 and maxiconsistency of Γn+1 in X , whence ✷KA ∈ ∆ and, there-
fore, ✷KA ∈ Ξ. By (A1) and maxiconsistency of Ξ we get then KA ∈ Ξ. Simi-
larly, if Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1, then Proven(A) ∈ Γn+1 by definition of an element. But
then ✷Proven(A) ∈ Γn+1, by Lemma 3.2 and maxiconsistency of Γn+1 in X , whence
✷Proven(A) ∈ ∆ and, therefore, ✷Proven(A) ∈ Ξ. By (A1) and maxiconsistency
of Ξ in X , we get then Proven(A) ∈ Ξ. Finally, if A ∈ FormX and j ∈ Ag, then,
since n > 0, we must have K✷¬Prove(j, A) ∈ Γn+1 by definition of an element,
whence ✷K✷¬Prove(j, A) ∈ Γn+1 by (A8) and maxiconsistency of Γn+1 in X , so that
✷K✷¬Prove(j, A) ∈ ∆ and, further, ✷K✷¬Prove(j, A) ∈ Ξ. By (A1) and maxicon-
sistency of Ξ in X , we get then that K✷¬Prove(j, A) ∈ Ξ. Thus (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ)α is
an element, and the rest is shown exactly as in Case 1.
4.3 R and E
We now define the justifications-related components of our canonical model. We
first define R as follows:
• R([(Γ)α]≡,m
′)⇔ (m′ ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡})&
&(∀τ ∈ m′)(∀A ∈ FormX)(KA ∈ Γ⇒ KA ∈ end(τ));
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• If n > 1, then
R([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡,m
′)⇔
⇔ (∃∆1, . . . ,∆k ⊆ FormX)(k > 0&m
′ = [(Γ1,∆1, . . . ,∆k)α]≡&
&(∀A ∈ FormX)(KA ∈ Γn ⇒ KA ∈ ∆k));
• R(†,m), for all m ∈ Tree;
• R(‡,m)⇔ m = ‡.
Now, for the definition of E :
• For all t ∈ Pol: E(†, t) = E(‡, t) = {A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A};
• For all t ∈ PolX and m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}:
(∀A ∈ Form)(A ∈ E(m, t)⇔
⇔ (∃t1 :B1) . . . (∃tn :Bn)((∀ξ ∈ m)(t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn ∈ end(ξ))&
& ⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn)→ t:A));
• (∀A ∈ FormX)({A} = E(m, y(j,A)) = E(m,wA) = E(m,uA)), for allm ∈ Tree\{†, ‡}
and j ∈ Ag;
• (∀A ∈ FormX)(A ∈ E(m, z)⇔ (∀ξ ∈ m)(Proven(A) ∈ end(ξ))), for allm ∈ Tree\{†, ‡};
• E(m, t) = Form, if m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡} and t ∈ Pol \ (PolX ∪ Y ∪W ∪ U ∪ {z}).
We start by mentioning a straightforward corollary to the above definition:
Lemma 8. For all m ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol it is true that {A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m, t).
Proof. This holds simply by the definition of E when m ∈ {†, ‡}. If m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡},
then we have another obvious case for t ∈ Pol \ (PolX ∪ Y ∪W ∪ U ∪ {z}).
If t ∈ PolX , and ⊢ t:A, then we have just a border case in the definition of E(m, t),
with t:A following from the empty conjunction of elements present in end(ξ) for every
ξ ∈ m.
Finally, if t ∈ Y ∪W ∪U ∪ {z}, then t ∈ PV ar, therefore, by Lemma 3.3, we must
have:
{A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A} = ∅ ⊆ E(m, t).
Note that since we know that for every c ∈ PConst and every instance A of one of
the axiom schemes in the list (A0)–(A13), it is true that ⊢ c:A (by (R3)), it follows,
among other things, that the above-defined function E satisfies the additional normality
condition on jstit models.
It is straightforward to check that R, as defined above, is a preorder on Tree, using
(A7) and (A8). Let us briefly look into why the future always matters constraint is
verified as well. Assume m ∈ Tree. If m = †, then it is connected to all the elements in
Tree by both ≤ and R, and if m = ‡, then it is connected only to itself by both ≤ and
R, so these moments cannot falsify the constraint. So let us assume that m is a class of
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equivalence generated by some element, say m = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡. If m ≤ m′, then m′
must be an equivalence class as well, and (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α must be an initial segment of
every element in m′, so that we may assume, wlog, thatm′ = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)α]≡ for some
k ≥ n. In particular, if n > 1, then k− 1 > 0. But then take an arbitrary A ∈ FormX .
If KA ∈ Γn, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γk)α is an element, KA ∈ Γk. By Lemma 3.5 and
maxiconsistency of Γk in X we must have then ✷KA ∈ Γk. Now, by definition of ≡,
we get KA ∈ end(τ) for any given τ ∈ m′. It follows then that R(m,m′) as desired.
We further check that the semantical constraints for E are verified:
Lemma 9. The function E, as defined above, satisfies both the monotonicity of evidence
and the evidence closure properties.
Proof. We start with the monotonicity of evidence. Assume R(m,m′) and t ∈ Pol.
If m ∈ {†, ‡} then, by Lemma 8, E(m, t) = {A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m′, t) for any
m′ ∈ Tree.
Assume, further, that m is an equivalence class of elements. Then, since we have
R(m,m′), m′ must be an equivalence class of elements as well. Also, we are done if
m = m′. On the other hand, if m 6= m′, then consider t. If t ∈ Pol \ (PolX ∪ {z}),
then we must have E(m, t) = E(m′, t) by definition, since m,m′ ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}. If
t = z, then take an arbitrary A ∈ E(m, z). By the above definition of E , this means
that Proven(A) ∈ end(ξ) for every element ξ of m. By maxiconsistency of end(ξ)
in X and (A11), this further means that KProven(A) ∈ end(ξ) for every element ξ
of m. Therefore, by R(m,m′), and the fact that m,m′ ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}, we get that
KProven(A) ∈ end(τ) for every element τ of m′, whence, by (A7), it follows that
Proven(A) ∈ end(τ) for every element τ of m′. Therefore A ∈ E(m′, z). Since A was
arbitrary, this means that E(m, z) ⊆ E(m′, z), as desired.
Finally, assume that t ∈ PolX and take an arbitrary A ∈ E(m, t). Then we can
choose t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn in such a way that for all ξ ∈ m we have t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn ∈ end(ξ),
and, moreover, ⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn) → t:A. Since t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn ∈ end(ξ), we
know that {t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn} ∈ FormX . We also know that, for every ξ ∈ m, end(ξ)
is maxiconsistent in X . Therefore, using Lemma 2, we obtain, successively:
(∀ξ ∈ m)(Kt1 :B1, . . . ,Ktn :Bn ∈ end(ξ)) (by Lemma 3.1)
(∀ξ ∈ m)((Kt1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧Ktn :Bn) ∈ end(ξ)) (by Lemma 2.5)
(∀ξ ∈ m)(K(t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn) ∈ end(ξ)) (by (A7))
From the latter it follows by R(m,m′) that K(t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn) ∈ end(τ) for all
τ ∈ m′. We also know that for every τ ∈ m′, end(τ) is maxiconsistent in X so that,
applying Lemma 2, and (A7), we get that t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn ∈ end(τ) for all τ ∈ m′.
Adding this to our initial assumption that ⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn) → t:A, we obtain
that A ∈ E(m′, t).
We turn now to the closure conditions. We verify the first two conditions, and
the third one can be verified in a similar way, restricting attention to t rather than
considering both s and t. Let s, t ∈ Pol. We need to consider two cases:
Case 1. m ∈ {†, ‡}. If A ∈ E(m, s), then ⊢ s:A. Therefore, by (A6), we must
also have ⊢ (s + t):A so that A ∈ E(m, s + t). Similarly, if A ∈ E(m, t), then also
A ∈ E(m, s + t) and the closure constraint (b) is verified. If, on the other hand, it is
true that for some A,B ∈ Form we have both A → B ∈ E(m, s) and A ∈ E(m, t),
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then, again, this means that both ⊢ s:A → B and ⊢ t:A. By (A4), it follows that
⊢ s× t:B and, therefore, also B ∈ E(m, s× t), so that the closure condition (a) is also
verified.
Case 2. m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}. If s+ t, s× t /∈ PolX , then we have:
E(m, s+ t) = E(m, s× t) = Form,
so that all the closure conditions are verified trivially. Therefore, assume that
s+ t, s× t ∈ PolX . If A ∈ Form and A ∈ E(m, s), then we can choose t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn
such that for all ξ ∈ m we have both t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn ∈ end(ξ) and
⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn)→ s:A.
By (A0) and (A6) we get then that ⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn) → s + t:A, which means
that A ∈ E(m, s+ t). Similarly, if A ∈ E(m, t), then A ∈ E(m, s+ t) as well, and closure
condition (b) is verified.
On the other hand, if A,B ∈ Form and we have both both A→ B ∈ E(m, s) and
A ∈ E(m, t), then we can choose t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn and also s1 :C1, . . . , sk :Ck such that
for every ξ ∈ m we have all of the following:
t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn, s1 :C1, . . . , sk :Ck ∈ end(ξ);
⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn)→ t:A;
⊢ (s1 :C1 ∧ . . . ∧ sk :Ck)→ s:(A→ B);
It follows then by (A0) and (A4) that:
(t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn ∧ s1 :C1 ∧ . . . ∧ sk :Ck)→ s× t:B,
so that B ∈ E(m, s× t) follows and closure condition (a) is verified.
4.4 Act and V
It only remains to define Act and V for our canonical model, and we define them
as follows:
• (m,h) ∈ V (p)⇔ p ∈ end(m ∩ h), for all p ∈ V ar;
• Act(†, (†, ‡)) = Act(‡, (†, ‡)) = ∅;
• Act(†, h) = {z}, if h 6= (†, ‡);
• Act(m,h) = {z} ∪ {y(j,A) | Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1}∪
∪{uA | ✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1}, ifm∩h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) ↑;
• Act(m,h) = {z} ∪ {y(j,A) | Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1}∪
∪{wA | ✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1}, ifm∩h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) ↓.
We begin by establishing some consequences of the above definition:
Lemma 10. The following statements are true:
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1. If (Γ)α is an element, then:
⋂
h∈H[(Γ)α]≡
(Act([(Γ)α]≡, h) = {z}.
2. If n > 1 and (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α is an element and g ∈ H[(Γ1,...,Γn)α]≡ is arbitrary,
then: ⋂
h∈H(Γ1,...,Γn)α]≡
(Act([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡, h) = Act([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡, g).
Proof. (Part 1). Set m := [(Γ)α]≡. It is clear from the definition of Act that
z ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)), so that we only need to show that z is the only member in
this intersection. The other elements of Act, according to the definition, can have
one of the following forms: either y(j,A), or uA, or wA, for some A ∈ FormX and
j ∈ Ag. We know, further, that both (Γ)α ≡ (Γ) ↑ and (Γ)α ≡ (Γ) ↓.4 Then, using
Lemma 6.2, take any h, h′ ∈ Hm for which h ∩ m = (Γ) ↑ and h′ ∩ m = (Γ) ↓.
By definition, Act(m,h) is disjoint from {wA | A ∈ FormX} whereas Act(m,h
′) is
disjoint from {uA | A ∈ FormX}, therefore,
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) must be disjoint from
{wA | A ∈ FormX} ∪ {uA | A ∈ FormX}. Finally, consider a variable of the form
y(j,A) for arbitrary A ∈ FormX and j ∈ Ag. If y(j,A) ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)), then
recall that for every (∆)α ∈ m there exists, by Lemma 6.2, a history h∆ ∈ Hm
such that (∆)α = m ∩ h∆. This means that Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ ∆ for
every (∆)α ∈ m, and thus, by maxiconsistency of ∆ in X and Lemma 2.5, that
Prove(j, A),¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ ∆ for every (∆)α ∈ m. In particular, we will have
Prove(j, A),¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ. Consider then the following set of formulas in X :
Ξ = {B | ✷B ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬Prove(j, A)}.
Ξ is consistent, for otherwise we would have:
⊢ (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk)→ Prove(j, A),
for some B1, . . . , Bk such that ✷B1, . . . ,✷Bk are all in Γ. Since ✷ is an S5-modality,
we would obtain that
⊢ (✷B1 ∧ . . . ∧✷Bk)→ ✷Prove(j, A),
whence, by maixiconsistency of Γ in X , it would follow that ✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ, and
the latter, given that also ¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ, would contradict Γ’s maxiconsistency.
Therefore, Ξ is consistent and we can extend Ξ to a set Θ ⊆ FormX , which is maxicon-
sistent in X . By definition, we will have (Γ)α ≡ (Θ)α, and thus (Θ)α ∈ m. But we will
also have ¬Prove(j, A) ∈ Θ which contradicts our assumption that Prove(j, A) ∈ ∆ for
every (∆)α ∈ m. This contradiction shows that no proof variable of the form y(j,A) is in⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)). Therefore, finally, we get our claim that
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) = {z}
verified.
4One of these two elements even coincides with (Γ)α, but we cannot tell, which one.
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(Part 2). We set m := [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡. It will suffice to show that, for all
h, h′ ∈ Hm, we have Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′). We know that for some appropriate
∆1, . . . ,∆n,Θ1, . . . ,Θn we will have:
m ∩ h = (∆1, . . . ,∆n)α,
and:
m ∩ h′ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn)α.
Since the length of m is greater than 1, we know that all elements in m share the same
greatest proper initial segment, so that we have:
Γi = ∆i = Θi
for all i < n, and, in particular:
Γ1 = ∆1 = Θ1.
Now it is clear from the definition of Act, that Act(m,h) and Act(m,h′) are completely
determined by α, ∆1 and Θ1, respectively, therefore, it follows thatAct(m,h) = Act(m,h
′).
We now check that the remaining semantic constraints on normal jstit models:
Lemma 11. The canonical model, as defined above, satisfies the constraints as to the
expransion of presented proofs, no new proofs guaranteed, presenting a new proof makes
histories divide, and epistemic transparency of presented proofs.
Proof. We consider the expansion of presented proofs first. Letm′ < m and let h ∈ Hm.
Then m′ 6= ‡, since ‡ has no <-successors. If m′ = † and m = ‡, then h must be (†, ‡)
and we have Act(†, (†, ‡)) = Act(‡, (†, ‡)) = ∅, so that the expansion of presented proofs
holds. If m′ = † and m is an equivalence class of elements, then h 6= (†, ‡), and we have
Act(†, h) = {z} and z ∈ Act(m,h). Finally, if m′ is an equivalence class of elements,
then m is also an equivalence class of elements. In this case, m ∩ h must be of the
form (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α for the respective Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ FormX and α ∈ {↑, ↓}. But then,
for some k ≤ n, m′ ∩ h must be of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γk)α. Since the extension of both
Act(m,h) and Act(m′, h) is determined by α and Γ1, and these are shared by bothm∩h
and m′ ∩ h, it follows that Act(m,h) = Act(m′, h) and thus Act(m,h) ⊆ Act(m′, h).
We consider next the no new proofs guaranteed constraint. Let m ∈ Tree. If
m ∈ {†, ‡}, then
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) =
⋃
m′<m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h)) = ∅ and the con-
straint is trivially satisfied. If m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}, then we need to distinguish between
two cases:
Case 1. The length of m equals 1. Then m is of the form [(Γ)α]≡ for the respective
Γ ⊆ FormX and α ∈ {↑, ↓}. By Lemma 10.1, we have then that
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) = {z}.
On the other hand, note that the only <-predecessor of [(Γ)α]≡ = m must be † and
therefore, by definition of Act, we get that
⋃
h∈Hm
(Act(†, h)) = {z} so that the no new
proofs guaranteed constraint is verified for m.
Case 2. The length ofm is greater than 1. Thenmmust be of the form [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)α]≡
for the respective Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1 ⊆ FormX , n > 0, and α ∈ {↑, ↓}. Then we choose,
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by Lemma 6.2, an arbitrary g ∈ Hm such that m ∩ g = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)α. For this
g we get, using Lemma 10.2:
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)α]≡, h)) = Act([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)α]≡, g)
= {z} ∪ {y(j,A) | Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1} ∪ {wA | ✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1}
= Act([(Γ1)α]≡, g)
⊆
⋃
m′<m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h)),
since [(Γ1)α]≡ < [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)α]≡.
We turn next to the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint. Con-
sider an m,m′ ∈ Tree such that m < m′ and arbitrary h, h′ ∈ Hm′ . If m = ‡,
then the constraint is verified trivially since ‡ has no <-successors. If m = † and
m′ = ‡, then we must have h = h′ = (†, ‡) and the constraint is verified trivially.
If m = † and m′ 6= ‡, then both h and h′ are different from (†, ‡), which means
that Act(†, h) = Act(†, h′) = {z}, and the constraint is again verified. Finally, if
m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}, then we must have m = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡ for some appropri-
ate Γ1, . . . ,Γn, α. But then, since m
′ > m, it must be that m′ = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)α]≡
for some k > n (so that, among other things, we know that k > 1). Now, given
that h, h′ ∈ Hm′ , this means that for appropriate ∆,∆′ ⊆ FormX we must have
h ∩m′ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk−1,∆)α and h′ ∩m′ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk−1,∆′)α, which, in turn, means
that:
h ∩m = h′ ∩m = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α.
It follows, by definition of Act, that in this case Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′), and the
constraint is verified.
It remains to check the epistemic transparency of presented proofs constraint. As-
sume that m,m′ ∈ Tree are such that R(m,m′). If we have m ∈ {†, ‡}, then, by
definition, we must have
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) = ∅, and the constraint is verified in a
trivial way. If, on the other hand, m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}, then, by R(m,m′), we must also
have m′ ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}. We have then two cases to consider:
Case 1. The length of m equals 1. Then, by Lemma 10.1, we know that⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) = {z}. It is also obvious, by the fact that m′ ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}, that
z ∈
⋂
h∈H′m
(Act(m′, h)) and thus the constraint is satisfied.
Case 2. The length ofm is greater than 1. Thenm = [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)α]≡ for appropri-
ate Γ1, . . . ,Γn, α, and, since we haveR(m,m
′), we must also havem′ = [(Γ1,∆1 . . . ,∆k)α]≡
for appropriate ∆1 . . . ,∆k. We assume that in fact α =↓, the other subcase is sim-
ilar. Using Lemma 6.2, we choose g ∈ Hm and g′ ∈ Hm′ in such a way that
m ∩ g = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) ↓ and m′ ∩ g′ = (Γ1,∆1 . . . ,∆k) ↓. We get then, by Lemma
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10.2:⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) = Act(m, g)
= {z} ∪ {y(j,A) | Prove(j, A) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1} ∪ {wA | ✷Prove(j, A) ∈ Γ1}
= Act(m′, g′)
=
⋂
h′∈Hm′
(Act(m′, h′)).
4.5 The truth lemma
It follows from Lemmas 5–11 that our above-defined canonical model is in fact a
normal jstit model. Now we need to supply a truth lemma:
Lemma 12. Let A ∈ FormX , let m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡}, and let h ∈ Hm. Then:
M,m, h |= A⇔ A ∈ end(m ∩ h).
Proof. As is usual, we prove the lemma by induction on the construction of A. The
basis of induction with A = p ∈ V ar we have by definition of V , whereas Boolean cases
for the induction step are trivial. We treat the modal cases:
Case 1. A = ✷B. If ✷B ∈ end(m ∩ h), then note that for every h′ ∈ Hm we
must have m ∩ h′ ∈ m so that m ∩ h′ ≡ m ∩ h. By definition of ≡ and the fact that
m ∈ Tree\{†, ‡}, we must have then B ∈ (m∩h′) for all h′ ∈ Hm and thus, by induction
hypothesis, we obtain that M,m, h |= ✷B. If, on the other hand, ✷B /∈ end(m ∩ h),
we need to consider then two subcases:
Case 1.1. The length of m equals 1. We must have then m ∩ h = (Γ)α for some
appropriate Γ and α so that Γ = end(m ∩ h). Then the set
Ξ = {✷C | ✷C ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬B}
must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ (✷C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Cn)→ B
for some ✷C1, . . . ,✷Cn ∈ Γ, whence, since ✷ is an S5-modality, we would get
⊢ (✷C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Cn)→ ✷B,
which would mean that ✷B ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent
and we can extend Ξ to a set ∆ ∈ FormX which is maxiconsistent in X . Of course,
in this case B /∈ ∆. We will have then that (∆)α is an element, and, by definition of
≡, that (Γ)α ≡ (∆)α. By Lemma 6.2, for some h′ ∈ Hm we will have (∆)α = m ∩ h′
and, therefore, ∆ = end(m ∩ h′). Since B /∈ ∆, it follows, by induction hypothesis,
that M,m, h′ 6|= B, hence M,m, h 6|= ✷B as desired.
Case 1.2. The length ofm is greater than 1. We must have thenm∩h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α
for some appropriate n > 0, Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ and α so that Γ = end(m∩h). We then define
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∆ as in Case 1.1 so that we have (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α ≡ (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α and show that
for any h′ ∈ Hm such that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α = m∩h′ and, eo ipso, ∆ = end(m∩h′), we
will have M,m, h′ 6|= B, whence M,m, h 6|= ✷B as desired. The only new ingredient
is that now we need to supply a proof that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α is actually an element.
Well, if for any C ∈ FormX we have that KC ∈ Γn, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is an
element, we will have KC ∈ Γ, whence, by maxiconsistency of Γ in X and Lemma 3.5,
✷KC ∈ Γ, and since every boxed formula from Γ is also in ∆, we get that ✷KC ∈ ∆,
whence KC ∈ ∆ by maxiconsistency of ∆ in X and S5 reasoning for ✷. Further, if
we have Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ1 for j ∈ Ag, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is an element, we
will have Proven(C) ∈ Γ, whence, by maxiconsistency of Γ in X and Lemma 3.2,
✷Proven(C) ∈ Γ, and since every boxed formula from Γ is also in ∆, we get that
✷Proven(C) ∈ ∆, whence ✷Proven(C) ∈ ∆ by maxiconsistency of ∆ in X and S5
reasoning for ✷. Finally, if C ∈ FormX and j ∈ Ag, then K✷¬Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ,
because (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is an element, whence ✷K✷¬Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ by (A8) and
maxiconsistency of Γ in X . And since every boxed formula from Γ is also in ∆, we
get that ✷K✷¬Prove(j, C) ∈ ∆ as well, hence K✷¬Prove(j, C) ∈ ∆ by (A1) and
maxiconsistency of ∆ in X .
Case 2. A = [j]B for some j ∈ Ag. Then, if [j]B ∈ end(m ∩ h), by definition of
Choice and the fact that m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡} we must have:
Choicemj (h) = {h
′ | h′ ∈ Hm, (∀C ∈ FormX)([j]C ∈ end(h∩m)⇒ C ∈ end(h
′∩m))}.
Therefore, if h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), then we must have B ∈ end(h
′ ∩m), and further, by
induction hypothesis, that M,m, h′ |= B, so that we get M,m, h |= [j]B. On the
other hand, if [j]B /∈ end(m ∩ h), we need to consider then two subcases:
Case 2.1. The length of m equals 1. We must have then m ∩ h = (Γ)α for some
appropriate Γ and α so that Γ = end(m ∩ h). Then the set
Ξ = {[j]C | [j]C ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬B}
must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ ([j]C1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Cn)→ B
for some [j]C1, . . . , [j]Cn ∈ Γ, whence, since [j] is an S5-modality, we would get
⊢ ([j]C1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Cn)→ [j]B,
which would mean that [j]B ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent
and we can extend Ξ to a set ∆ ⊆ FormX which is maxiconsistent in X . Of course,
in this case B /∈ ∆. We will have then that (∆)α is an element.
Now, if D ∈ FormX is such that ✷D ∈ Γ, then, by (A2) and maxiconsistency
of Γ in X , we know that [j]D ∈ Γ, so that also [j]D ∈ ∆, and hence, by (A1) and
maxiconsistency of ∆ in X , D ∈ ∆. We have thus shown that:
(∀D ∈ FormX)(✷D ∈ Γ⇒ D ∈ ∆), (3)
and it follows that (Γ)α ≡ (∆)α by definition of ≡. By Lemma 6.2, for some h′ ∈ Hm
we will have (∆)α = m ∩ h′ and, therefore, ∆ = end(m ∩ h′). Also, since ∆ contains
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all the [j]-modalized formulas from Γ, we know that for any such h′ we will have
h′ ∈ Choicemj (h). Since B /∈ ∆, it follows, by induction hypothesis, thatM,m, h
′ 6|= B,
hence M,m, h 6|= [j]B as desired.
Case 2.2. The length ofm is greater than 1. We must have thenm∩h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α
for some appropriate n > 0, Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ and α so that Γ = end(m∩h). We then define
∆ as in Case 2.1 so that we have (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α ≡ (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α and show that
for any h′ ∈ Hm such that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α = m ∩ h′ and, eo ipso, ∆ = end(m ∩ h′),
we will have both h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) and M,m, h
′ 6|= B, whence M,m, h 6|= [j]B as
desired. Again, a separate argument for (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,∆)α being an element needs to be
supplied, and it can be done in the same way as in Case 1.2, given that by (3) and S5
properties of ✷ we know that every boxed formula from Γ is also in ∆.
Case 3. A = KB. Assume that KB ∈ end(m ∩ h). We clearly have then
m = [(m ∩ h)]≡. Hence, by definition of R and the fact that m ∈ Tree \ {†, ‡} we
must have for every m′ ∈ Tree:
R(m,m′)⇒ (∀τ ∈ m′)(∀C ∈ FormX)(KC ∈ end(m ∩ h)⇒ KC ∈ end(τ)).
Therefore, if R(m,m′) and h′ ∈ Hm′ is arbitrary, then, of course, (h′∩m′) ∈ m′ so that
KB ∈ end(h′ ∩m′), and, further, B ∈ end(h′ ∩m′) by S4 reasoning for K. Therefore,
by induction hypothesis, we get that M,m′, h′ |= B, whence M,m, h |= KB. On the
other hand, if KB /∈ end(m ∩ h), we need to consider then two subcases:
Case 3.1. The length of m equals 1. We must have then m ∩ h = (Γ)α for some
appropriate Γ and α so that Γ = end(m ∩ h). Then the set
Ξ = {KC | KC ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬✷B}
must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ (KC1 ∧ . . . ∧KCn)→ ✷B
for some KC1, . . . ,KCn ∈ Γ, whence, since K is an S4-modality, we would get
⊢ (KC1 ∧ . . . ∧KCn)→ K✷B,
which would mean that K✷B ∈ Γ, hence, by (A1), (A7) and maxiconsistency of Γ
in X , that KB ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent and we
can extend Ξ to a set ∆ ⊆ FormX which is maxiconsistent in X . Of course, in this
case ✷B /∈ ∆. We will have then that (∆)α is an element. So we set m′ = [(∆)α]≡.
Assume that (∆′)α′ ≡ (∆)α. Then every boxed formula from ∆ will be in ∆′. In
particular, whenever KC ∈ ∆, then also ✷KC ∈ ∆ and thus KC ∈ ∆′, by Lemma 3.5
and maxiconsistency of ∆ in X . Therefore, whenever KC ∈ Γ and τ ∈ m′ = [(∆)α]≡,
we have that KC ∈ end(τ) so that we must have R(m,m′). On the other hand, since
✷B /∈ ∆, then, by Case 1, there must be a τ ∈ m′ such that B /∈ end(τ). But then, by
Lemma 6.2, we can choose h′ ∈ Hm′ in such a way that τ = m′ ∩ h′, and we get that
B /∈ end(m′ ∩ h′). Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we get M,m′, h′ 6|= B. In view
of the fact that also R(m,m′), this means that M,m, h 6|= KB as desired.
Case 3.2. The length ofm is greater than 1. We must have thenm∩h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α
for some appropriate n > 0, Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ and α so that Γ = end(m ∩ h). We then
define ∆ as in Case 3.1 and consider m′ = [(Γ1,∆)α]≡. We get then R(m,m
′) immedi-
ately by definition of R. Just as in Case 3.1, we will use the fact that ✷B /∈ ∆ to find
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τ ∈ m′ and h′ ∈ Hm′ so that τ = m′ ∩ h′ and B /∈ end(τ). It will follow by induction
hypothesis that M,m′, h′ 6|= B, hence, given that R(m,m′), that M,m, h 6|= KB.
The only new ingredient is that now we need to supply a proof that (Γ1,∆)α is
actually an element. Well, if for any C ∈ FormX we have that KC ∈ Γ1, then,
since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is an element, we will have KC ∈ Γ, whence KC ∈ ∆. Fur-
ther, if we have Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ1 for j ∈ Ag, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is an ele-
ment, we will have Proven(C) ∈ Γ, whence, by maxiconsistency of Γ in X and (A11),
KProven(C) ∈ Γ, and since every K-modalized formula from Γ is also in ∆, we get
that KProven(C) ∈ ∆, whence Proven(C) ∈ ∆ by maxiconsistency of ∆ in X and
S4 reasoning for K. Finally, if C ∈ FormX and j ∈ Ag, then K✷¬Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ,
because (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is an element. And since every K-modalized formula from Γ
is also in ∆, we get that K✷¬Prove(j, C) ∈ ∆ as well.
Case 4. A = t:B for some t ∈ PolX . Note that by (A0) we know that ⊢ t:B → t:B.
Therefore, if t:B ∈ end(m ∩ h), we will have A ∈ E(m, t) by definition. Also, by (A5)
and maxiconsistency of end(m ∩ h) in X , we will have KB ∈ end(m ∩ h). There-
fore, by Case 3, we will have that M,m, h |= KB and further, by A ∈ E(m, t), that
M,m, h |= t:B. On the other hand, if t:B /∈ end(m ∩ h), then for no
t1 :B1, . . . , tn :Bn ∈ end(m ∩ h) can it be that:
⊢ (t1 :B1 ∧ . . . ∧ tn :Bn)→ t:B,
for in this case we would also have t:B ∈ end(m∩h) by maxiconsistency of end(m∩h)
in X . Therefore, we must have A /∈ E(m, t) so that M,m, h 6|= t:B.
Case 5. A = Proven(B). Assume that Proven(B) ∈ end(m∩h). Then, by Lemma
3.1 and maxiconsistency of end(m ∩ h), we will also have ✷Proven(B) ∈ end(m ∩ h).
Now, choose an arbitrary ξ ∈ m. We know that end(ξ) ≡ end(m ∩ h), therefore, we
must have Proven(B) ∈ end(ξ) by definition of ≡, which means that B ∈ E(m, z). We
also have z ∈ Act(m,h′) for all h′ ∈ Hm and we will have KB ∈ end(m∩h) by (A11) so
that we haveM,m, h |= z :B by Case 3 and induction hypothesis.5 It follows then that
M,m, h |= Proven(B). On the other hand, assume that Proven(B) /∈ end(m ∩ h).
Then we have to consider two subcases:
Case 5.1. The length of m equals 1. Then, since Proven(B) /∈ end(m∩ h), we will
have B /∈ E(m, z) by definition. Also, by Lemma 10.1, we know that⋂
h′∈Hm
Act(m,h′) = {z}. It follows that M,m, h 6|= Proven(B).
Case 5.2. The length ofm is greater than 1. We must have thenm∩h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α
for some appropriate n > 0, Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ and α so that Γ = end(m ∩ h). We will as-
sume that in fact α =↑, the reasoning for the case α =↓ is similar. It follows then, by
Lemma 10.2:
⋂
h′∈Hm
Act(m,h′) = {z} ∪ {y(j,C) | Prove(j, C) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ1}∪
∪ {uA | ✷Prove(j, C) ∈ Γ1}.
We know that B /∈ E(m, z) since Proven(B) /∈ Γ. If, for some j ∈ Ag, we would
have Prove(j, B) ∈ Γ1, it would follow that Proven(B) ∈ Γ, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)α is
5Note that sentences like z :B are not covered by our induction since z /∈ PolX ; but sentences like
KB are covered since B ∈ FormX . This is the reason why our argument invokes Case 3 rather than
Case 4.
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an element. Therefore, if uC , y(j,C) ∈
⋂
h′∈Hm
Act(m,h′) for any j ∈ Ag, then C 6= B
and therefore B /∈ E(m,uC) = E(m, y(j,C)) = {C}. It follows then that for no proof
which is presented under all histories through m, this proof will be acceptable for B,
hence we get M,m, h 6|= Proven(B).
Case 6. A = Prove(j, B) for some j ∈ Ag. Assume that Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m∩h).
Then we know that the length of m must be 1. Indeed, if length of m were greater
than 1, then we would have K✷¬Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m ∩ h), whence, by S4 reasoning
for K, S5 reasoning for ✷, and maxiconsistency of end(m ∩ h) in X we would have
¬Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m ∩ h), so that Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m ∩ h) would be impossible.
So, for some appropriate Γ and α we will have both m = [(Γ)α]≡ and m∩h = (Γ)α.
We need to consider two subcases:
Case 6.1. ✷Prove(j, B) ∈ Γ. Then, for all h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), we will have, of
course, m ∩ h′ ≡ m ∩ h which means, by maxiconsistency and S5 reasoning for ✷,
that we will also have ✷Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m ∩ h′). This will mean that for all
h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) we will have either uB or wB in Act(m,h
′) and we will have, of
course B ∈ E(m,uB) = E(m,wB). Further, by (A9) and maxiconsistency in X of
every end(m ∩ h′) with h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) we know that also KB ∈ m ∩ h
′ for ev-
ery such h′. Therefore, we know by Case 3 above that either M,m, h′ |= uB :B, or
M,m, h′ |= wB :B for every h′ ∈ Choicemj (h).
Assume, further, that for some s ∈ Pol we haveM,m, h |= s:B. Then, in particu-
lar, we must have B ∈ E(m, s). By definition of E , s cannot then be a proof variable of
the form uC , wC , or y(j,C) for any j ∈ Ag and any formula C different from B. More-
over, s cannot be z, since we have Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m∩h) whence by maxiconsistency
of end(m∩h) in X and (A9), ¬Proven(B) ∈ end(m∩h), so that, again by maxiconsis-
tency, Proven(B) /∈ end(m ∩ h) ∈ m, which means, by the above definition of E , that
B /∈ E(m, z). Therefore, assuming that M,m, h |= s:B, s can be either in PolX or in
Pol \ (PolX ∪Y ∪W ∪U ∪{z}), or else in {wB, uB, y(j,B) | j ∈ Ag}. Well, if s is either
in PolX or in Pol\(PolX∪Y ∪W ∪U ∪{z}), then it is immediate from the definition of
Act that s /∈ Act(m,h). On the other hand, if s ∈ {y(j,B) | j ∈ Ag}, then note that by
maxiconsistency of end(m ∩ h) in X we must have Prove(j, B) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, B) /∈ Γ
whence it immediately follows that, again s /∈ Act(m,h). Finally, consider two ele-
ments (Γ) ↑ and (Γ) ↓. One of these elements is actually (Γ)α, both elements are in
m, and, by Lemma 6.2, we can choose h′, h′′ ∈ Hm in such a way that we have both
(Γ) ↑= m ∩ h′ and (Γ) ↓= m ∩ h′′ . It clearly follows then from the definition of Act
that wB /∈ Act(m,h′), whereas uB /∈ Act(m,h′′).
Case 6.2. ✷Prove(j, B) /∈ Γ. Then, by maxiconsistency of Γ = end(m ∩ h) in X ,
we must have Prove(j, B) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, B) ∈ Γ as well as (again, by maxiconsistency
of Γ in X and Lemma 3.4) [j](Prove(j, B)∧¬✷Prove(j, B)) ∈ Γ. Therefore, for every
h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) we will have Prove(j, B) ∧ ¬✷Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m ∩ h
′) simply by
definition of Choice. This further means that for every such h′, the proof variable
y(j,B) will be in Act(m,h
′). Besides, it is immediate from the definition of E that
B ∈ E(m, y(j,B)). Finally, note that by (A9) and maxiconsistency of the respective
end(m∩h′) in X , we will haveKB ∈ end(m∩h′) for every h′ ∈ Choicemj (h). Therefore,
by Case 3 above, we will have M,m, h′ |= y(j,B) :B for every h
′ ∈ Choicemj (h).
Assume, further, that for some s ∈ Pol we have M,m, h |= s:B. Just as in Case
6.1, we can show that s cannot be of the form z, uC , wC , or y(j,C) for any j ∈ Ag
and any formula C different from B. Then, again borrowing our reasoning from the
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Case 6.1 above, we can show that if s ∈ PolX or s ∈ Pol \ (PolX ∪ Y ∪W ∪U ∪ {z}),
then we must have s /∈ Act(m,h). If s is uB or wB then we must have s /∈ Act(m,h)
since ✷Prove(j, B) /∈ Γ = end(m ∩ h), and therefore, by maxiconsistency of Γ in
X and (A10) we must have ✷Prove(i, B) /∈ Γ = end(m ∩ h) for all i ∈ Ag. As-
sume then that s is y(i,B) for some i ∈ Ag. If y(i,B) /∈ Act(m,h), then we are
done. If, on the other hand, y(i,B) ∈ Act(m,h), then, by definition of Act, we
must have Prove(i, B) ∧ ¬✷Prove(i, B) ∈ Γ = end(m ∩ h), hence, by Lemma 2.5,
¬✷Prove(i, B) ∈ end(m ∩ h). Then the set
Ξ = {✷C | ✷C ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬Prove(i, B)}
must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ (✷C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Cn)→ Prove(i, B)
for some ✷C1, . . . ,✷Cn ∈ Γ, whence, since ✷ is an S5-modality, we would get
⊢ (✷C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Cn)→ ✷Prove(i, B),
which would mean that ✷Prove(i, B) ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ
is consistent and we can extend Ξ to a set ∆ ⊆ FormX which is maxiconsistent in X .
Of course, in this case Prove(i, B) /∈ ∆. We will have then that (∆)α is an element,
and, by definition of ≡, that (Γ)α ≡ (∆)α. By Lemma 6.2, for some h′ ∈ Hm we will
have (∆)α = m∩h′ and, therefore, ∆ = end(m∩h′). Since Prove(i, B) /∈ ∆, it follows
that y(i,B) /∈ Act(m,h
′).
Thus we have shown that if Prove(j, B) ∈ end(m∩h), thenM,m, h |= Prove(j, B).
For the inverse direction, assume that Prove(j, B) /∈ end(m ∩ h). Again, we have to
consider two further subcases:
Case 6.3. The length of m equals 1 so that, for some appropriate Γ and α we have
both m = [(Γ)α]≡ and m ∩ h = (Γ)α. If M,m, h |= Proven(B), then by (A9) we
will have M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B), and thus we will be done. Therefore, assume that
M,m, h 6|= Proven(B). Moreover, ifM,m, h 6|= KB then we will again have, by (A9),
that M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B), so that we may also safely assume that M,m, h |= KB.
Under these assumptions, in order to show that M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B) we have to
show that the positive condition fails in that there is an h′ ∈ Choicemj (h) such that no
acceptable proof of B is present in Act(m,h′). To this end, we consider the set
Ξ = {[j]C | [j]C ∈ Γ} ∪ {
∧
i∈Ag
¬Prove(i, B)}.
This set must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ ([j]C1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Cn)→
∨
i∈Ag
Prove(i, B)
for some [j]C1, . . . , [j]Cn ∈ Γ, whence, since [j] is an S5 modality, we would get
⊢ ([j]C1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Cn)→ [j](
∨
i∈Ag
Prove(i, B)),
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which would mean that [j](
∨
i∈Ag Prove(i, B)) ∈ Γ. On the other hand, since
Prove(j, B) /∈ Γ, this means, by maxiconsistency of Γ in X , that ¬Prove(j, B) ∈ Γ,
whence, again by maxiconsistency and (A13), we obtain that 〈j〉(
∧
i∈Ag ¬Prove(i, B)) ∈ Γ.
Therefore, by maxiconsistency of Γ in X , we must have ¬[j](
∨
i∈Ag Prove(i, B)) ∈ Γ,
a contradiction.
Therefore, Ξ is consistent and we can extend Ξ to a set ∆ ⊆ FormX which is
maxiconsistent in X . Of course, in this case we will have Prove(i, B) /∈ ∆ for all
i ∈ Ag. We will have then that (∆)α is an element, and, arguing as in Case 2.1 we can
show (3) so that ∆ contains all boxed formulas from Γ. Therefore, by definition of ≡,
we know that (Γ)α ≡ (∆)α. By Lemma 6.2, we know that for some h′ ∈ Hm we will
have (∆)α = m∩h′ and, therefore, ∆ = end(m∩h′). Also, since ∆ contains all the [j]-
modalized formulas from Γ, we know that for any such h′ we will have h′ ∈ Choicemj (h).
We also know that Proven(B) /∈ ∆, for otherwise we would have, by maxiconsistency
of ∆ and Lemma 3.2, that ✷Proven(B) ∈ ∆, whence, by the fact that (Γ)α ≡ (∆)α
we would have that Proven(B) ∈ Γ, contradicting our assumptions.
Consider then Act(m,h′). We may assume that α =↑, the reasoning for the case
when α =↓ is similar. We have, by definition of Act that:
Act(m,h′) = {z}∪{y(i,C) | Prove(i, C)∧¬✷Prove(i, C) ∈ ∆}∪{uC | ✷Prove(i, C) ∈ ∆}.
We know that B /∈ E(m, z), since we have established that Proven(B) /∈ ∆; we also
know that if uC , y(i,C) ∈ Act(m,h
′) for any i ∈ Ag, then C 6= B since for all i ∈ Ag we
have Prove(i, B) /∈ ∆, and this means that if uC , y(i,C) ∈ Act(m,h
′) for any i ∈ Ag,
then both B /∈ E(m,uC) and B /∈ E(m, y(i,C)). Therefore, at (m,h
′) there exists no
presented proof which would be acceptable for B, and since h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), this
means that the positive condition for Prove(j, B) at (m,h) is violated, so that we get
M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B) as desired.
Case 6.4. The length of m is greater than 1. Then, by Lemma 10.2, for all h′ ∈ Hm
we have that
Act(m,h′) =
⋂
h′′∈Hm
Act(m,h′′).
Assume then, that we have both s ∈ Act(m,h) and M,m, h |= s:B for some s ∈ Pol.
Then s ∈
⋂
h′′∈Hm
Act(m,h′′), which means that the negative condition for Prove(j, B)
at (m,h) is violated and we must have M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B). Assume, on the
contrary, that there is no s ∈ Pol for which both s ∈ Act(m,h) and M,m, h |= s:B.
Then, since h is of course in Choicemj (h), it turns out that the positive condition for
Prove(j, B) at (m,h) is violated and again have M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B). So, in any
case M,m, h 6|= Prove(j, B), as desired.
This finishes the list of the modal induction cases at hand, and thus the proof of
our truth lemma is complete.
5 The main result
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2. The proof proceeds as follows. One
direction of the theorem was proved as Corollary 1. In the other direction, assume
that Γ ⊆ FormX is consistent. Then, by Lemma 2.1, Γ can be extended to a ∆
which is maxiconsistent in X . But then choose an arbitrary α ∈ {↑, ↓} and consider
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M = 〈Tree,≤, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉, the canonical model defined in Section 4. The
structure (∆)α is an element, therefore [(∆)α]≡ ∈ Tree. By Lemma 6.2, there is
a history h ∈ Hm such that (∆)α = [(∆)α]≡ ∩ h. For this h, we will also have
∆ = end([(∆)α]≡ ∩ h). By Lemma 12, we therefore get that:
M, [(∆)α]≡, h |= ∆ ⊇ Γ,
and thus Γ is shown to be satisfiable in a normal jstit model.
Remark. Note that the canonical model used in this proof is X-universal in the
sense that it satisfies every consistent subset of FormX .
As an obvious corollary of Theorem 2 we get the following weak completeness result:
Corollary 2. For every A ∈ Form, ⊢ A iff A is valid over normal jstit models.
Proof. One direction follows from Theorem 1. In the other direction, if 6⊢ A, then {¬A}
is consistent. Setting X to be the set of proof variables occurring in A, we see that
PV ar \ X must be countably infinite. Therefore, Theorem 2 applies, {¬A} must be
satisfied in some normal jstit model, and A cannot be valid.
As a further corollary, we deduce a restricted form of compactness property:
Corollary 3. Let X ⊆ PV ar be such that PV ar \ X is countably infinite. Then an
arbitrary Γ ⊆ FormX is satisfiable iff every finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ is satisfiable.
Proof. If Γ is satisfiable, then clearly every finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ is satisfiable. On the other
hand, if every finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ is satisfiable, then for no A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ can we have
that ⊢ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → ⊥, for otherwise, by Theorem 1, the finite set {A1, . . . , An}
would be unsatisfiable. Therefore, Γ must be consistent, and, by Theorem 2, also
satisfiable.
6 Conclusions and future research
Theorem 2, the main result of this paper, proves what might be called a restricted
strong completeness theorem for the implicit jstit logic. As we have shown in Section
5, this means, among other things, that this logic allows for a finitary proof system and
enjoys a restricted form of compactness property. Taken together, these results show
that, given the rich variety of expressive means present in the implicit jstit logic and
non-trivial semantic constraints imposed on its models, this logic displays a surprising
degree of regularity.
Of course, the results of the present paper give room to some generalization. One
obvious observation would be that the rule (R3) gives but one variant out of the infinite
family of the so-called constant specifications allowed for in justification logic; and it is
straightforward to see that the above completeness proof can be easily adapted for the
systems with other versions of constant specification. The other obvious direction of
generalizing the results above would be to relieve the restriction that R = Re and con-
sider the semantics of [5] in its full generality, although, as we have already mentioned,
it is not so clear whether this generalization will affect the set of validities.
In the broader perspective, Theorem 2 is a step towards axiomatization of the
full basic justification stit logic in case such an axiomatization is possible. Viewing
Theorem 2 as a partial success in axiomatizing the full basic jstit logic, it is easy to
see which steps shall come next. First, one needs to understand the mechanics behind
the proving modalities omitted from the implicit jstit logic and axiomatize the logic of
Prove(j, t, A) and Proven(t, A) placed on top of stit and justification modalities; then
an axiomatization of a system combining both explicit and implicit proving modalities
and their interplay may turn out to be possible. As a promising further step in this
direction, one can consider, for example, the logic of the so-called E-notions, introduced
in [6]. It allows one to define a combination of implicit and explicit proving modalities,
even though this combination is but a subset of the variety of proving modalities
definable within the full basic jstit logic, and can, therefore, provide a demo version
of the problems to be encountered in an attempt to explore the properties of the full
system.
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